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My dissertation is comprised of two essays in the field of industrial organization with an 
emphasis on the airline industry.  In particular, I investigate how airline mergers and alliances 
affect the components of total cost.  By using a methodology that does not require the researcher 
to have cost data, I am able to infer marginal costs, fixed costs and sunk costs changes associated 
with mergers and alliances. 
My first essay examines two recent airline mergers—Delta/Northwest and 
United/Continental.  Most post-merger analysis in airlines disproportionately focuses on 
assessing price rather than cost changes.  Perhaps one reason is that reliable price data are more 
readily available.  Despite the difficulty of obtaining cost data, researchers have sought to 
empirically assess whether cost efficiency gains associated with a merger outweigh the increased 
market power of the merged firm.  The results from my analysis suggest that both mergers are 
associated with marginal and fixed costs savings, but higher market entry costs.  The magnitude 
of the cost effects differed across the mergers.  Moreover, I find that the market power effects of 
these mergers were negligible. 
My second essay investigates the cost effects of the codesharing alliance between Delta, 
Northwest and Continental Airlines.  Codesharing is one of the most popular forms of airline 
cooperation that allows an airline to market and sell seats on its partners’ flights as though it 
owns those flights.  Studies have found that airline alliances have very little to no effect on total 
cost.  Rather than analyzing cost as a whole, I study whether a disaggregate analysis on cost is 
more appropriate.  I find evidence that forming an alliance helps generate more passenger traffic 
for the alliance partners thereby reducing the partner carriers' marginal cost.  Even though the 
literature has found that the total cost effects to be small, an alliance can have a considerable 
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Essay 1 - Measuring Merger Cost Effects:  Evidence from a 
Dynamic Structural Econometric Model 
1.1 Introduction 
As suggested in Whinston (2007, pp. 2435), most papers that conduct a retrospective 
empirical analysis of mergers focus on assessing price rather than cost changes associated with 
mergers.
1
  Perhaps a reason for the disproportionate focus on price rather than cost is that reliable 
price data are more readily available.  Despite the difficulty in obtaining cost data, researchers 
have sought to empirically assess whether cost efficiency gains associated with a merger 
outweigh the increased market power of the merged firm.
2
  For example, Kim and Singal (1993) 
use pre-post merger relative changes in price and industry concentration to infer whether cost 
efficiency gains from a set of mergers outweigh increased market power of the merged firms.  
The idea is that if the merger causes both price and industry concentration to increase, then it can 
be inferred that market power increases outweigh cost efficiency gains.  Even when price and 
cost data are not available, researchers have relied heavily on theory and market share data to 
empirically assess whether cost efficiency gains of a merger outweigh market power increases of 
the merged firm [Gugler and Siebert (2007)].  In this case the theoretical prediction relied on is 
that if the merged firm’s market share increases relative to the pre-merger joint market share of 
the firms that merge, then it can be inferred that cost efficiency gains outweigh market power 
increases [see Gugler and Siebert (2007)]. 
It is clear from the literature that researchers are interested in measuring cost efficiency 
gains associated with mergers.  Furthermore, merger cost efficiency gains may not just be 
restricted to marginal cost, even though this is the type of cost efficiency gain that most quickly 
puts downward pressure on short-run pricing.  For example, a merger may eliminate duplication 
of some service departments of a firm, such as marketing and other administrative areas, which 
in turn is more likely to lower recurrent fixed cost rather than marginal cost.  In addition, 
                                                 
1
 Examples of such merger analyses in the airline industry include: Werden, Joskow, and Johnson (1989); 
Borenstein (1990); Brown (2010); Luo (2011); Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2012); Huschelrath, and Muller (2012). 
 
2
 See Williamson (1968) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) for theoretical treatments of the opposing effects of 




complementary characteristics/expertise across firms that merge may lower the merged firm’s 
cost of entry into new markets.  Lower recurrent fixed and sunk entry costs may allow the 
merged firm to enter new markets in the medium or long-run that the unmerged firms would not 
have individually entered without the merger [Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev (2010)].
3
  
New entry potentially reduces price.  So in the medium or long-run, recurrent fixed and sunk 
market entry cost efficiency gains could result in lower prices and higher welfare.  We are 
unaware of papers in the literature that explicitly separate merger cost effects into these three 
main categories of cost – (1) marginal cost; (2) recurrent fixed cost; and (3) sunk market entry 
cost.    
The main objective of our paper is to estimate marginal, recurrent fixed and sunk entry 
cost effects associated with two recent airline mergers – Delta/Northwest (DL/NW) and 
United/Continental (UA/CO) mergers – using a methodology that does not require the researcher 
to have cost data.  Before describing our methodology, it is useful to briefly discuss previous 
related work. 
Werden, Joskow and Johnson (1989) investigated the price effects of two airline mergers: 
(1) Northwest (NW) and Republic (RC) airlines; and (2) Trans World Airline (TWA) and Ozark 
Airlines (OZ).  Both mergers occurred in fall 1986.  The authors find that the TWA-OZ merger 
caused a slight overall increase in fares in city pairs out of their major hub in St. Louis (1.5 
percent).  However, the merger between Northwest and Republic appears to have caused a more 
significant increase in fares.  Overall fares went up by 5.6 percent on city pairs out of their major 
hub in Minneapolis-St. Paul.    
Borenstein (1990) also examines market effects of the NW/RC and TWA/OZ airline 
mergers.  He finds that the TWA/OZ merger had no systematic impact on these carriers price on 
routes originating at their St. Louis HUB since their price changes on these routes averaged 
almost exactly the same as the industry average price changes.  In contrast, NW/RC merger 
seems to increase their price on routes out of their main hub in Minneapolis.  Borenstein finds 
that both mergers are associated with increases in the merged firms’ market share on routes 
originating from their main hub. 
                                                 
3
 Benkard, Bodoh-Creed, and Lazarev (2010), study the potential medium and long-run dynamic effects of three 
airline mergers.  They focus on predicting the “potential” medium and long-run effects of mergers on industry 
structure, rather than explicitly measuring the “actual” effects of mergers on firms’ cost structure. 
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 Kim and Singal (1993) examine price changes associated with 27 airline mergers during 
1985 – 1988.  The authors compute price changes of merging firms on sample routes (or treated 
routes) and compare them to price changes on control routes that do not have the merging firms.  
Using this same difference-in-differences methodology used for computing relative fare changes, 
the authors compute relative changes in industry concentration (relative changes in Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)).  The authors infer that market power effects outweigh cost efficiency 
gains if a positive relationship between relative price changes and industry concentration is 
found.  Alternatively, the authors infer that cost efficiency gains outweigh market power effects 
if a negative relationship between relative price changes and industry concentration is found.  
The authors find that for the full sample, cost efficiency gains are dominated by the exercise of 
market power because the relationship between relative price changes and relative changes in 
industry concentration is positive and statistically significant. 
Peters (2006) investigates five mergers that occur in the 1980s.  He first uses pre-merger 
data to estimate a model derived from the assumption that airlines set prices according to a static 
Bertand-Nash game.  The estimated model is then used to simulate predicted post-merger prices.  
He compares the simulation prediction of post-merger prices with observed post-merger prices 
and investigates the sources of deviations between these two sets of prices.  He finds that there 
are significant differences between the average observed price changes and the average predicted 
price changes.  He argues that these differences are mainly due to supply-side effects that may 
include changes in marginal costs, implying that mergers do influence marginal cost. 
It is also useful to briefly describe findings of merger analyses in other industries.  Gugler 
and Siebert (2007) find that mergers in the semiconductor industry raise the market share of 
participating firms.  They argue on theoretical grounds that this is sufficient evidence to suggest 
that cost efficiency gains dominate market power effects for mergers in this industry. 
Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) use actual cost data to empirically investigate whether 
hospital consolidation leads to cost savings.  The authors, with cost data in hand, estimated a 
translog cost function at the hospital level over pre-post consolidation periods.  The authors rely 
on a difference-in-differences identification methodology.  Cost function estimates reveal that 
consolidations into systems (i.e. common ownership but operations and financial reporting 
remain separate for the entities that consolidated, therefore limited corporation post-
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consolidation) does not generate cost savings, even after 4 years.  However, mergers in which 
hospitals consolidate financial reporting and licenses generate saving of approximately 14%. 
Harrison (2011) examines cost savings due to scale economies associated with hospital 
mergers.  Using actual cost data, she non-parametrically estimate costs for each individual 
reporting entity before and after the merger.  Her findings suggest that economies of scale exist 
for the merging hospitals and that they take advantage of these cost savings immediately 
following a merger.  The findings also indicate that cost savings are higher one year after the 
merger than in subsequent years.     
In the set of papers cited above we can see that some researchers were able to use actual 
cost data to measure merger efficiencies, while others relied on theoretical predictions to exploit 
more readily available data on price and/or market share to infer whether merger cost efficiency 
gains outweigh increases in market power.  One of the key distinctions between our paper and 
previous work that we are aware of is that, without the need for actual cost data, we use a 
methodology that allows for separate identification of marginal; recurrent fixed; and sunk entry 
cost effects associated with a merger.  The following is a brief summary description of our 
methodology.       
We begin by specifying and estimating a static differentiated products Bertrand-Nash 
game.  The static model incorporates both demand and short-run supply.  We first estimate a 
discrete choice model of air travel demand.  For the short-run supply aspect of the model, we 
assume that prices are set according to a static differentiated products Bertrand-Nash equilibrium 
with multiproduct firms.  The static Bertrand-Nash assumption allows us to derive product-
specific markups and recover product-level marginal cost.  With marginal cost estimates in hand, 
along with data on variables that should shift marginal cost, we then specify and estimate a 
marginal cost function.  For a given merger of interest, we specify the marginal cost function in a 
way that allows all firms' (both non-merging firms and firms that merge) marginal cost to change 
in the post-merger period relative to the pre-merger period.  Consistent with a difference-in-
differences methodology, we identify marginal cost effects of a merger by comparing the pre-
post merger change in merging firms' marginal cost relative to the change in non-merging firms' 
marginal cost. 
With the product-specific markups in hand, we are able to compute firm-level variable 
profits.  Estimates of firm-level variable profits are subsequently used in a dynamic entry/exit 
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game, which is the long-run part of our model used for identifying recurrent fixed and sunk entry 
cost.  In the dynamic entry/exit game, each airline chooses markets in which to be active during 
specific time periods in order to maximize its expected discounted stream of profit, where per-
period profit comprises variable profit less per-period fixed cost and a one-time entry cost if the 
airline is not currently serving the market but plans to do so next period.  The dynamic entry/exit 
game allows us to estimate fixed and entry costs by exploiting estimates of variable profits 
previously computed from the static Bertrand-Nash game along with observed data on airlines’ 
decisions to enter and exit certain markets.  For a given merger of interest, we allow all firms' 
(both non-merging and the firms that merge) fixed and entry cost functions to change in the post-
merger period relative to the pre-merger period.  Consistent with a difference-in-differences 
methodology, we identify fixed and entry cost effects of a merger by comparing the pre-post 
merger change in merging firms' fixed and entry cost functions relative to the change in non-
merging firms' fixed and entry cost functions. 
 Our empirical results reveal that for the merging firms:  (1) Marginal cost efficiency 
gains are associated with both DL/NW and UA/CO mergers; (2) Fixed cost efficiency gains are 
associated with both DL/NW and UA/CO mergers; (3) Both mergers however are associated 
with increased market entry costs; and (4) The magnitudes of these effects differ across the two 
mergers.  The magnitude of marginal cost savings associated with the DL/NW merger is smaller 
than that of the UA/CO merger.  In contrast, the magnitude of fixed cost savings associated with 
the DL/NW merger is greater than that of the UA/CO merger.  The magnitude of the increase in 
market entry costs associated with the UA/CO merger is greater than that of the DL/NW merger.  
In the case of non-merging airlines, we find that their recurrent fixed costs are unchanged 
throughout the entire evaluation periods for both mergers.  However, non-merging airlines’ 
market entry costs increase after the DL/NW merger, but decrease after the UA/CO merger.   
 We also estimate a regression in which a variable of product markups generated from the 
structural model is regressed on several determinants of markup.  Results from this product 
markup regression reveal that both mergers led to only small increases in markups, suggesting 
that market power effects of these mergers were negligible. 
 Results from our structural model are consistent with results from a reduced-form price 
regression we estimate.  The reduced-form price regression reveals evidence that each merger is 
associated with price decreases, which suggests the marginal cost efficiencies outweigh market 
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power increases.  However, the reduced-form price regression is not able to separately measure 
the magnitudes of marginal cost efficiencies and markup increases associated with the mergers, 
hence the need for our structural model analysis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  The next section presents some details of 
the two mergers.  Section 1.3 describes the working sample.  Sections 1.4 and 1.5 present the 
static and dynamic models, respectively.  Section 1.6 describes the estimation procedure of the 
static model.  A brief discussion of those estimation results follows in section 1.7.  Section 1.8 
describes the estimation method for the dynamic model, as well as discussions of those results.  
Section 1.9 provides additional discussion of some results and section 1.10 concludes. 
1.2 Details of the DL/NW and UA/CO mergers 
Delta and Northwest announced their plan to merge on April 14, 2008.  At the time, it 
would create the largest U.S. commercial airline measured by available seat miles.  Delta’s 
headquarters and primary hub are based in Atlanta, Georgia while Northwest was headquartered 
in Eagan, Minnesota and has a primary hub in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  At the time, Delta and 
Northwest were the third and fifth largest airlines in the United States, respectively.   
On October 29, 2008, the United States Department of Justice (DoJ) approved the merger 
after a six months investigation.  The DoJ’s approval release statement suggests that the two 
airlines networks overlapped in some origin-destination markets, which normally triggers 
antitrust concerns with a proposed merger.  However, the DoJ did not challenge the merger in 
these markets because the DoJ is satisfied that either: (1) sufficient competition from other 
airlines was present; or (2) cost efficiency gains would be sufficient to mitigate anti-competitive 




“The two airlines currently compete with a number of other legacy and low cost airlines in the 
provision of scheduled air passenger service on the vast majority of nonstop and connecting 
routes where they compete with each other. In addition, the merger likely will result in 
efficiencies such as cost savings in airport operations, information technology, supply chain 
economics, and fleet optimization that will benefit consumers.” 
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From the perspective of the merging airlines’ executives, they believe that Delta and 
Northwest are a good fit on many levels.  They assert that the combination will benefit 
customers, employees, shareholders, and the communities they serve.  Moreover, it will help 
create a more resilient airline for long-term success and financial stability.  In terms of possible 
efficiency gains from the merger, they anticipate that by 2012, major revenue and cost synergies 
in excess of $1 billion a year will be achieved.
5
  Approximately $700-$800 million of benefits is 
anticipated to come from combining and improving the airlines’ complementary network 
structure, where effective fleet optimization will account for more than half of those network 
benefits.  Cost synergies are anticipated to come from the combining of sales agreements, vendor 
contracts, and more efficient operation of airport facilities.  They will also streamline overhead 
structures, redundant facilities, and technology integration.  While the airlines anticipate that 
much of these costs savings will be offset by higher wages and benefits for employees of the 
combined carrier, they estimate these gains to be in the $300-$400 million range. 
Approximately two years following the DL/NW merger, on May 3, 2010 United (UA) 
and Continental (CO) made public their plan to merge.  Even though the formal announcement 
did not take place until two years later, United and Continental merger negotiations were 
underway at the time of the DL/NW merger.  The unification of distinct cultures and groups of 
workers who were represented by different unions slowed progress of the merger.  Nonetheless, 
the merger was approved by the DoJ on August 27, 2010 creating the largest U.S. passenger 
airline based on capacity, as measured by year 2009 available seat miles, surpassing DL/NW.   
Although it only took three months for the DoJ to approve the UA/CO merger—much 
shorter than the DL/NW approval— there was a major concern.  The number of overlapping 
routes between United’s hub airports and Continental’s hub at Newark Liberty Airport was large.  
Continental had a high share of service at this hub, and new entry into markets connected to this 
hub was difficult because of the limited number of available slots.  Therefore, Continental and 
United had to agree to give up some take-off and landing slots at Newark Liberty Airport to 
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Southwest Airlines in order to gain DoJ’s approval.
6
  Continental would lease 18 pairs of take-
off and landing slots during peak and off-peak travel times to Southwest.  Although the number 
is relatively small, Southwest did not have any presence there previously and it only had limited 
service at neighboring La Guardia Airport.  The slot-transfer agreement therefore was enough to 
ease DoJ’s anticompetitive concerns.   
Unlike the Delta and Northwest executives, United and Continental did not provide 
numerical projections of the possible efficiency gains from the merger.  They believe, however 
that UA and CO are compatible partners in many ways.  For example, both have similar fleets 
and operate in different geographic markets that complement each other.  Flying mainly Boeing 
aircrafts helps reduce costs associated with multiple orders.  Operating in distinct geographical 
markets enables them to link and expand their networks as United’s strength is mainly in the 
western part of the United States while Continental has a larger presence in the east coast.
7
  In 
sum, efficiency gains are anticipated from both mergers. However, by providing numerical 
projections, Delta and Northwest seem to be more confident in achieving of those gains compare 
to United and Continental.   
1.3 Data Construction, Descriptive Statistics and Definitions  
The dataset comes from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1BMarket) collected by 
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  It is quarterly data that constitute a 10 percent sample of 
airline tickets from reporting carriers.  Each observation is a flight itinerary that includes 
information such as the identity of the airline, airfare, number of passengers that purchase the 
specific itinerary, market miles flown on the trip itinerary, origin and destination airports, as well 
as intermediate airport stops.  Unfortunately, the DB1B data do not contain passenger-specific 
information, or information on ticket restrictions such as advance-purchase and length-of-stay 
requirements. 
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  We use data that span from the first quarter of 2005 to the third quarter of 2011.  The raw 
dataset contains millions of observations each quarter.  For example, there are 9,681,258 
observations in the third quarter of 2011.  We define and construct our estimation sample in the 
following manner:  
 
i. City selection:  Following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) among others, we focus on 
air travel between the 64 largest US cities based on the Census Bureau's Population 
Estimates Program (PEP) which produces estimates of the population for the United 
States.  We use data from the category “Cities and Towns”.  We group cities that 
belong to the same metropolitan areas and share the same airport.  Table 1.1 provides 
a list of the cities, corresponding airport groupings and population estimate in 2009.
8
  
Our sample has a total of 55 metropolitan areas (“cities”) and 63 airports.  
ii. Market definition:  A market is defined as directional origin-destination-time period 
combination.  Directional means that Dallas to Atlanta is a different market than 
Atlanta to Dallas.     
iii. Product definition:  A product is defined as an itinerary-operating carrier 
combination.  For example, a direct flight from Dallas to Atlanta operated by 
American Airline.  
iv. Airlines:  There are three types of carriers in the data—ticketing carrier, operating 
carrier, and reporting carrier.  The ticketing carrier is the airline that issues the flight 
reservation or ticket to consumers.  The operating carrier is the airline that engages 
directly in the operation of the aircraft, i.e., the airline that actually transports the 
passengers.  The reporting carrier submits the ticket information to the Office of 
Airline Information.  We focus on products that use a single operating carrier for all 
segments of the trip itinerary and designate the operating carrier as the “owner” of the 
product.  Table 1.2 lists the names and associated code of the 41 carriers in our 
sample.  
v. Itinerary selection:  We drop all itineraries with market fares less than $50 or greater 
than $2,000.  Eliminating fares that are too low helps avoid discounted fares that may 
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 Population estimates of each year were used even though only year 2009 estimates are reported.  
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be due to passengers using their frequent-flyer miles to offset the full price of the trip.  
We also drop all itineraries with the following characteristics:  (1) outside the 48 
mainland US states; (2) one-way tickets; and (3) more than two intermediate stops. 
vi. Price and quantity:  An observation in the data may contain more than one passenger 
buying the same product at different fares.  Thus, the dataset has many repeated 
products due to passengers paying different fares.  We construct the price and 
quantity variables by averaging the market fare and aggregating number of 
passengers by defined products respectively.  During a given time period, a product 
appears only once in the collapsed data.  Last, a product survives deletion from our 
sample if it is purchased by at least 9 consumers during a quarter, which helps in 
eliminating products that are not part of the regular offerings by an airline.   
vii. Observed Product Shares:  From the collapsed dataset, Observed Product Shares 
(subsequently denoted by upper case   ) are constructed by dividing quantity of 
product   purchased (subsequently denoted by   ) by the market size (subsequently 
denoted by POP).  As in Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006) and Berry and Jia (2010), 
we use the geometric mean of a market’s origin city population and destination city 
population as a measure of the market size.
9
 
viii. Origin and destination presence:  We create two variables that capture the 
magnitudes of an airline’s “presence” at the market endpoint cities.  The Origin 
presence variable is calculated by aggregating the number of destinations that an 
airline connects with the origin city using non-stop flights.  Similarly, the Destination 
presence variable is calculated by aggregating the total number of destinations that an 
airline connects with the destination city using non-stop flights.  The greater the 
number of different cities that an airline provides service to using non-stop flights 
from a given airport, the greater the “presence” the airline has at that airport.  
ix. Creation of other variables:  Interstop is a variable that captures one measure of 
travel itinerary convenience, and is measured by the number of intermediate stops in a 
product’s itinerary.  Inconvenience is another variable that captures the relative 
                                                 
9
 Since we find that many products have extremely small product shares based on the definition of market size used, 
we scaled up all product shares in the data set by a common factor.  The common factor used is the largest integer 
such that the outside good share (        
 
   ) in each market remains positive.  In our data set this common 
factor is 35.  It turns out that estimation results are qualitatively similar with or without using this scaling factor.    
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convenience to the consumer of a product’s flight itinerary.  It is calculated by 
dividing the itinerary distance flown from the origin to destination by the nonstop 
flight distance between the origin and destination.  If a product uses a nonstop 
itinerary, its Inconvenience measure takes the minimum value, which is 1. 
Table 1.3 shows summary statistics of variables used in estimation.  The average market 
fare is approximately $166.  Origin and destination presence variables measure an airline’s scale 
of operation at an airport.  On average, airlines service approximately 29 different cities from the 
relevant market’s origin and destination cities respectively.  The average distance flown across 
all products is about 1,500 miles.   
Table 1.1 Cities Airports and Population 
City, State Airports 2009 
Population 
City, State Airports 2009 
Population 
New York City, NY and 
Newark, NJ 
LGA, JFK, EWR 8,912,538 Las Vegas, NV LAS 567,641 
Los, Angeles, CA LAX, BUR 3,831,868 Louisville, KY SDF 566,503 
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW 2,851,268 Portland, OR PDX 566,143 
Dallas, Arlington, Fort 
Worth and Plano, TX 
DAL, DFW 2,680,817 Oklahoma City, OK OKC 560,333 
Houston, TX HOU, IAH, EFD 2,257,926 Tucson, AZ TUS 543,910 
Phoenix-Tempe-Mesa, AZ PHX 2,239,335 Atlanta, GA ATL 540,922 
Philadelphia, PA PHL 1,547,297 Albuquerque, NM ABQ 529,219 
San Antonio, TX SAT 1,373,668 Kansas City, MO MCI 482,299 
San Diego, CA SAN 1,306,300 Sacramento, CA SMF 466,676 
San Jose, CA SJC 964,695 Long Beach, CA LGB 462,604 
Denver-Aurora, CO DEN 933,693 Omaha, NE OMA 454,731 
Detroit, MI DTW 910,921 Miami, FL MIA 433,136 
San Francisco, CA SFO 815,358 Cleveland, OH CLE 431,369 
Jacksonville, FL JAX 813,518 Oakland, CA OAK 409,189 
Indianapolis, IN IND 807,584 Colorado Spr., CO COS 399,827 
Austin, TX AUS 786,386 Tula, OK TUL 389,625 
Columbus, OH CMH 769,332 Wichita, KS ICT 372,186 
Charlotte, NC CLT 704,422 St. Louis, MO STL 356,587 
Memphis, TN MEM 676,640 New Orleans, LA MSY 354,850 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN MSP 666,631 Tampa, FL TPA 343,890 
Boston, MA BOS 645,169 Santa Ana, CA SNA 340,338 
Baltimore, MD BWI 637,418 Cincinnati, OH CVG 333,012 
Raleigh-Durham, NC RDU 634,783 Pittsburg, PA PIT 311,647 
El Paso, TX ELP 620,456 Lexington, KY LEX 296,545 
Seattle, WA SEA 616,627 Buffalo, NY BUF 270,240 
Nashville, TN BNA 605,473 Norfolk, VA ORF 233,333 
Milwaukee, WI MKE 605,013 Ontario, CA ONT 171,603 




Table 1.2 List of Airlines in Sample 
Airline 
Code 
Airline Name Airline 
Code 
Airline Name 
16 PSA Airlines L3 Lynx Aviation 
17 Piedmont Airlines NK Spirit  
3C Regions Air NW Northwest
4
 
3M Gulfstream OO SkyWest  
9E Pinnacle QX Horizon Air 
9L Colgan Air RP Chautauqua  
AA American
1
 RW Republic 
AL Skyway  S5 Shuttle America Corp. 
AQ Aloha Air Cargo SX Skybus  
AS Alaska  SY Sun Country  
AX Trans States  TZ ATA  
B6 JetBlue  U5 USA 3000  
C5 Commutair UA United
5
 





 VX Virgin America 
CP Compass  WN Southwest 
DH Independence Air XE ExpressJet  
DL Delta
3
  YV Mesa
7
 
F9 Frontier YX Midwest  
FL AirTran    
G4 Allegiant Air   
G7 GoJet    
   1
 American (AA) + American Eagle (MQ) + Executive (OW) 
   
2
 Continental (CO) + Expressjet (RU) 
   
3
 Delta (DL) + Comair (OH) + Atlantic Southwest (EV) 
   
4
 Northwest (NW) + Mesaba (XJ) 
   
5
 United (UA) + Air Wisconsin (ZW) 
   
6 
US Airways (US) + America West (HP) 
   
7
 Mesa (YV) + Freedom (F8) 
 
Table 1.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Time period span of data: 2005:Q1 to 2011:Q3 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price
a
 165.89 50.67 38.51 1,522 
Quantity 213.85 604.05 9 11,643 
Inconvenience 1.14 0.22 1 3.09 
Interstop 0.79 0.45 0 2 
Origin presence 29.06 25.86 0 177 
Destination presence 28.92 25.60 0 176 
Itinerary distance flown (miles)
b
 1,544 720.96 36 4,099 
Nonstop flight distance (miles) 1,377 667.41 36 2,724 
Observed Product Shares (  ) 
0.0090 0.026 5.39e-5 0.97 







 In DB1B database this variables is reported as “Market miles flown”. 
c




We estimate the static parts of our model (demand and marginal cost equations) on the 
full sample of data (2005:Q1 to 2011:Q3) since estimating these parts of the model are not 
computationally intensive.  However, due to significant computational intensity required to 
estimate the dynamic part of the model, we had to treat each merger separately when examining 
fixed and entry cost effects, which allows us to use more manageable pre-post merger periods 
data subsamples for each merger.  In case of the DL/NW merger, we use 2007:Q1 and 2007:Q2 
for the pre-merger period data, and 2011:Q1 and 2011Q:2 for the post-merger period data.  In 
case of the UA/CO merger, we use 2009:Q1 and 2009:Q2 for the pre-merger period data, and 
2011:Q1 and 2011:Q2 for the post-merger period data.  
 Similar to Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), we use a number of passengers’ threshold to 
determine whether or not an airline is actively servicing an origin-destination market.  We define 
an airline to be active in a directional origin-destination market during a quarter if the airline 
transports at least 130 passengers in this market during the quarter.
10
  Table 1.4 indicates that in 
the post-merger period, UA/CO has entered into 65 new markets—markets where neither 
operated before merging.  Likewise, the table shows that DL/NW has entered into as many as 
123 new markets—markets where neither operated before they merged.  Perhaps these markets 
are the high cost-to-enter markets where if it were not for the merger, they would not have 
entered.  
Table 1.4 Number of Unique Markets Entered and Exited Post-merger 
 United/Continental Delta/Northwest 
Number of Entries 65 123 
Number of Exits 187 267 
 Reduced-form Price Regression 
To help motivate the need for our subsequent structural model, we start by examining 
how each merger affects price via a reduced-form price regression.  Identification of the merger 
price effects in the reduced-form price regression relies on a difference-in-differences 
methodology.  This identification strategy is in keeping with how many studies, some of which 
we discussed in the introduction, conduct retrospective analyses of mergers.  
                                                 
10
 The 130 passenger threshold we use for a directional market is equivalent to the 260 for non-directional market 
used by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012). 
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Table 1.5 shows estimation results from a simple reduced-form price equation.    
   and 
  
   are zero-one time period dummy variables that take the value 1 only in the post-merger 
period for each merger respectively.      
   is for the DL/NW merger, while   
   is for the 
UA/CO merger.        is a zero-one airline-product dummy variable that equals 1 for all 
products that are associated with either Delta or Northwest.  Similarly,       is a zero-one 
airline-product dummy variable that equals 1 for all products that are associated with either 
Continental or United.  The coefficients on the interaction variables,   
         and   
   
     , therefore measure how DL/NW and UA/CO’s prices change over the respective pre and 
post-merger periods, while the coefficients on   
   and   
   measure how non-merging airlines’ 
price change over the respective pre-post merger periods.   
Table 1.5 Estimation Results for Reduced-form Price Regression  
647,167 observations:  2005-Q1 to 2011-Q3 














         
-14.6719 *** 0.5417 
Itinerary distance flown (miles) 0.0357*** 0.0001 
Interstop -0.1187 0.1554 
Origin presence 0.4998*** 0.0086 
(Origin presence)
2
 -0.0003*** 0.00008 
Dest. Presence 0.5335*** 0.00871 
(Dest. presence)
2
 -0.0005*** 0.00007 
Constant 113.1979*** 1.2036 
Operating carrier effects YES 
Origin city effects YES 
Destination city effects YES 
Quarter and Year effects YES 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. The equation is estimated using ordinary  
least squares. 
 
The coefficient estimate on   
   is not statistically significant at conventional levels of 
statistical significance, suggesting that non-merging airlines’ price, on average, did not change 
over the pre-post DL/NW merger periods.  However, the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient estimate on   
         indicates that the prices of products offered by Delta and 
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Northwest, on average, declined by $7.22 (a 4% decline from pre-merger mean price level) over 
the pre-post DL/NW merger periods. 
The coefficient estimate on   
   is positive and statistically significant, and suggests that 
non-merging airline prices increase, on average, by $1.13 (a 0.7% increase over pre-merger 
mean price level) over the pre-post UA/CO merger periods.  In contrast to non-merging airlines, 
the negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate on   
         suggests that the 
prices of products offered by United and Continental declined, on average, by $14.67 (a 8% 
decline from pre-merger mean price level) over the pre-post UA/CO merger periods.    
The reduced-form evidence suggests that both mergers are associated with lowering the 
merging firms’ prices.  However, the UA/CO merger seems to be associated with a larger decline 
in prices, both in terms of dollars and percentage, compared to the DL/NW merger.  Since the 
mergers are associated with falling prices, we can infer that marginal cost savings outweigh 
market power increases associated with the mergers.  However, a structural model is needed to 
disentangle and separately measure the magnitudes of marginal cost savings and markup 
increases (a measure of market power) associated with the mergers. 
All other control variables in the reduced-form price regression have the expected sign.  
Itinerary distance positively affect price, likely via its influence on marginal cost.  Prices are 
lower for products with intermediate stops, perhaps because passengers prefer nonstop products.  
The size of an airlines’ presence at the endpoint airports of a market is initially positively related 
to price, but becomes negatively related to price as size of airport presence increases beyond a 
certain threshold.  This relationship between price and size of airport presence could in part be 
driven by economies of passenger-traffic density, i.e., lowering of marginal cost as airlines 
channel large number of passengers though their major hub airports.    
1.4 Model 
 Demand 
We model air travel demand using a discrete choice framework.  A passenger   chooses 
among a set of       alternatives in market   during period  , that is, the passenger either 
chooses one of the     differentiated air travel products in the market or the outside option/good 
     .  The outside option includes other modes of transportation besides air travel.    Products 
16 
 
are organized into     mutually exclusive groups,           where the outside good is the 
only member of group .  A group is a set of products offered by an airline within a market.   
Potential passenger   solves the following utility maximization problem: 
 
    
           
                              
  ,     (1) 
 
where       is passenger  ’s indirect utility from choosing product  ;       is the mean level of 
utility across passengers that choose product  ;        is a random component of utility common 
across all products within the same group;  and      
  is an independently and identically 
distributed (across products, consumers, markets and time) random error term assumed to have 
type 1 extreme value distribution.  The parameter   lies between 0 and 1 and measures the 
correlation of consumer utility across products belonging to the same group/airline.  The 
correlation of preferences increases as   approaches 1.  In the case where   is 0, the model 
collapses to the standard logit model where products compete symmetrically. 
 The mean utility,     , is specified as: 
 
           
                                  ,  (2)  
 
where      is a vector of observed non-price product characteristics.  The variables in      were 
briefly defined in the previous section, they include: (1) the number of intermediate stops in a 
product (Interstop);  (2) an alternate measure of itinerary convenience (Inconvenience); and (3) a 
measure of the size of an airline’s presence at the origin city (Origin presence).    The vector of 
parameters,  , measures passengers’ marginal utilities associated with the measured non-price 
product characteristics.  The price is     , and associated parameter,  
 , captures the marginal 
utility of price.  Airline fixed effects,   , are captured by airline dummy variables.  Time period 
effects,   , are captured by quarter and year dummy variables.          and       are origin 
and destination city fixed effects.       is the unobserved (by researchers) component of product 
characteristics that affect consumer utility.  For notational convenience, we drop the market and 
time subscripts in some subsequent equations.  
The demand for product   is given by: 
 
                 




where     is the geometric mean between the origin city population and destination city 
population, which is our measure of market size; and           
        is the predicted share 
function that has functional form based on the nested logit model.
11
      , and   are vectors of 
observed non-price product characteristics, price, and the unobserved vector of product 
characteristics, respectively.    ,  , and   are demand parameters to be estimated. 
 Variable Profit, Product Markups and Product Marginal Costs 
Each airline   offers a set of    products for sale.  Thus, airline   has the variable profit 
function: 
 
                  ,         (4) 
 
where   ,   , and   are the respective price, marginal cost, and the quantity of product   sold by 
airline  .  In equilibrium, the amount of product   an airline sells equals to the demand, that is, 
                    
       .  
We assume that airlines set prices according to a static Nash-Bertrand game.  Therefore, 
the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium is characterized by the following system of   first-order 
equations:  
 
        
   
   
          for all              (5) 
 
Using matrix notation, the system of first-order conditions in equation (5) is represented by: 
 
                   ,                   (6) 
 
where s, p, and mc are J×1 vectors of predicted product shares, product prices, and marginal 
costs respectively, Ω is J×J matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones that describes 
airlines’ ownership structure of the J products,    is the operator for element-by-element matrix 
                                                 
11
 The nested logit model has the following well-known predicted product share function:    
    
  





   
      
    
    
, where         
  
   
      and    is the set of products belonging to group  . 
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multiplication, and Δ is a J×J matrix of first-order derivatives of product market shares with 
respect to prices, where element     
   
   
. 
 The structure of matrix  effectively determines groups of products in a market that are 
jointly priced.  Therefore, the structure of  is different in pre-merger periods compared to post-
merger periods.  In pre-merger periods  reflects the fact that separately owned airlines non-
cooperatively price their products, however in post-merger periods we appropriately update the 




Re-arranging equation (6), we can obtain a vector of product markups: 
 
                               .           (7) 
 
where                is the vector of demand parameter estimates.  Let                 
be an element in              .  Note that                 is a product markup function 
which depends exclusively on demand-side variables and parameter estimates. 
With computed product markups in hand, product marginal costs can be recovered by: 
 
                          
         (8) 
 
In addition, an airlines’ variable profit in a market can be computed by:  
 
                                         (9) 
1.5 Dynamic Entry/Exit Game 
In every period (quarter), each airline decides which market(s) to be active in to 
maximize its expected intertemporal profits.  Let airlines be indexed by  , markets by  , and 
period by  .  An airline’s expected discounted stream of profit in market m is given by:  
 
         
        
 
    ,      (10) 
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 See Nevo (2000) for details on how matrix  differs pre-merger versus post-merger. 
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where         is the per-period profit of the airline in market  and         is the time 
discount factor.  Each airline’s per-period profit is specified as the difference between variable 
profit and the sum of fixed and one-time market entry costs: 
 
         
                 
                      
    ,   (11) 
 
where     
            is the variable profit of airline   in market   during period  .  The 
value       is computed from the static Nash-Bertrand game described previously.       is a 
zero-one indicator variable that equals to 1 if airline   had decided in period     to be active in 
market   during period  .       is also a zero-one indicator variable, but unlike     ,       
equals to 1 if airline   decides in period   to be active in    .  Therefore, by definition      
       .   
After deciding to be active in a market, we assume that it takes time (one period) for 
airline   to actually begin operating in market   - time-to-build assumption.   This time-to-build 
assumption implies that if        and       , then airline    pays fixed and entry costs in 
period   even though flight operations do not actually begin until        Note that in period t, 
     is a decision variable, while      is a state variable.  So we use different letters (     
versus     ) to make the distinction between an airline’s decision versus a state variable.   
       and       are the deterministic portions of fixed and entry costs functions 
respectively and are common knowledge for all airlines.      
   and     
   represent private 
information shocks to fixed and entry costs respectively.  The composite shock          
   
            
   is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) over airlines, 
markets, and time period based on a specific probability distribution function, which we assume 
is the type 1 extreme value distribution.   
We specify the deterministic portions of fixed and entry cost functions as follows: 
 
           
     
              
                       
                                 
                    
                                 
                                       ,  (12) 
 
           
     
            
                       
                                  
                    
                                 




        is a measure of an airline’s presence at the endpoint airports of origin-destination 
market m, which we define as the mean number of destinations the airline serves from the 
market’s endpoint airports using nonstop flights.                      is a zero-one time-
period dummy variable that takes the value 1 only during the post-merger period for the relevant 
merger being studied.                    is a zero-one  airline dummy variable that takes the 
value 1  if the airline is one of the airlines that is a part of the relevant merger being studied.  The 
structural parameters to be estimated are: 
 
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
      
  
  
  and   
  measure the mean fixed and entry costs across airlines, markets and time, 
respectively.    
  and   
  capture the effects of the size of airport presence on fixed and entry 
costs.    
  and   
  capture how fixed and entry costs change for all other airlines except the 
merging parties across the pre and post-merger periods.    
  and   
   measure any persistent 
systematic difference in mean fixed and entry costs of the merging airlines relative to other 
airlines.  The coefficients of interest are   
  and   
   which identify changes in fixed and entry 
costs resulting from the relevant merger being studied, that is, these parameters capture the 
possible fixed and entry cost efficiency gains associated with a merger. 
 Reducing the Dimensionality of the State Space 
Recall that the variable profit function is defined as: 
 
     




                                             .    (15) 
 
Note that variable profits are functions of state variables      .  Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) 
suggest that these state variables can be aggregated into a single state variable,     
  rather than 
treating        as separate state variables.  In other words, we can treat     
     as a firm-specific 
state variable rather than treating   and   as separate state variables, which serves to significantly 





               
                                 (16) 
 
 Each airline has the same vector of state variables, which it takes into account when 
making decisions.  Decision-making of each airline also depends on the strategies and actions of 
other airlines via     
 .  Recall that     
  depends on competition from other incumbents 
currently in the market, which implies that this state variable depends on the previous period’s 
entry/exit decisions of other airlines.  Thus, our dynamic entry-exit model does implicitly take 
into account this strategic interaction among competitors. 
 Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) 
For notational convenience, we drop the market subscript.  Let                 be the 
vector of strategies for each airline where             
                              is a 
vector of common knowledge state variables and     is assumed to be i.i.d.  In a Markov Perfect 
Equilibrium each airline behaves according to its best response strategy, which maximizes its 
own value function given the state and strategies of other airlines.     
Let   
          be the value function for airline  .  This value function is the unique 
solution to the following Bellman equation: 
 
  
             
         
 
   
                   
     
                           
              
 .  (17) 
 
   
          is the expected per-period profit function and   
               is the expected 
transition of state variables.  We describe how state variables transition in Appendix A.  The 
profile of strategies in   is a MPE if, for every airline i and every state         , we have:  
 
                 
         
 
   
                   
     
                           
              
 .  (18) 
 
 In Appendix B we illustrate that the MPE can also be represented as a vector of 
conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) that solves the fixed point problem         , where 
                                        .           is a vector of best response 
probability mapping, where      is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution. 
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1.6 Demand and Marginal Cost Estimation 
Our strategy for estimating the demand parameters           is such that the observed market 
shares,     , are equal to the market shares predicted by the model     .  As shown in Berry 
(1994), in the case of the nested logit model, such an estimation strategy implies the following 
linear equation to be estimated: 
     
                          
                                       
                                                        ,      (19) 
 
where      is the observed share of the outside good and        is the observed within group 
share of product j.  Equation (19) can be estimated by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) given 
that the equation is linear, and      and            are endogenous.  
 We use the following linear specification for the marginal cost function: 
 
                         
         
               
         
            
                                          
   ,     (20) 
 
where       represents product-level marginal cost estimates that were recovered using equation 
(8).      is a vector of observed marginal cost-shifting variables and    is the associated vector 
of parameters to be estimated.  Recall that   
   is a zero-one time-period dummy variable that 
equals 1 during time periods after the DL/NW merger.        is a zero-one airline-product 
dummy variable that equals 1 for all products that are associated with either Delta or Northwest.  
   is a parameter that measures, on average, how marginal cost changes over the pre-post 
DL/NW merger periods for products that are not associated with Delta or Northwest.  However, 
   is a parameter that measures, on average, how marginal cost changes over the pre-post 
DL/NW merger periods for Delta and Northwest products.  Therefore,    measures the possible 
marginal cost efficiencies associated with the DL/NW merger. 
   
   is a zero-one time-period dummy variable that equals 1 during time periods after the 
UA/CO merger.        is a zero-one airline-product dummy variable that equals 1 for all 
products associated with either United or Continental.     is a parameter that measures, on 
average, how marginal cost changes over the pre-post UA/CO merger periods for products that 
are not associated with United or Continental.  However,    is a parameter that measures, on 
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average, how marginal cost changes over the pre-post UA/CO merger periods for United and 
Continental products.  Therefore,    measures the possible marginal cost efficiencies associated 
with the UA/CO merger. 
    is an airline-specific component of marginal cost captured by airline dummy 
variables.     captures time-varying effects on marginal cost that are unobserved by us the 
researchers.  These unobserved time-varying effects are measured using quarter and year dummy 
variables.          and       are sets of origin and destination city dummy variables 
respectively.  Finally,     
   is an unobserved random component of marginal cost.  Equation (20) 
is estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). 
 Instruments 
It is likely that in the demand equation, equation (19), the product price (    ) and the 
within group share (      ) are correlated with unobserved product characteristics,     .  For 
example, an airline may have a very effective advertising campaign to promote its brand.  Even 
though this activity is unobservable to the researcher, it is observable to the consumers and to the 
airline and therefore may affect how that airline sets prices for its products.   
To estimate equation (19) consistently, we need a set of variables (instruments) that are 
uncorrelated with the demand residual but correlated with price and within group share.  The 
instruments that we use are: (1) itinerary distance; (2) interaction of jet fuel price with itinerary 
distance; (3) interaction of jet fuel price with operating carrier dummies; (4) an airline's market 
mean itinerary inconvenience measure; (5) an airline's market sum itinerary inconvenience 
measure; (6) mean number of intermediate stops across products offered by an airline in a 
market.   
 As discussed in Gayle (2007 and 2012), instruments (1)-(3) are motivated by the fact that 
a product’s price is influenced by the marginal cost of providing the product.  The intuition for 
instrument (1) is that flying distance covered by an air travel product is likely to be correlated 
with the marginal cost of providing the product.  The intuition for instruments (2) and (3) is that 
airlines' marginal costs are likely to change differently when there are shocks to jet fuel price.
13
  
This differential effect across airlines is due to the fact that airlines differ in the intensity with 
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 Jet fuel price data are drawn from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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which they use jet fuel because: (i) they differ in their mix of aircrafts; and (ii) they differ in their 
route network structures, and therefore itinerary flight distances may differ across airlines.
14
  
Furthermore, instruments (1) to (3) should be valid since itinerary distance and fuel price shocks 
are each unlikely to be correlated with     .  
Instruments (4)-(6) are used for within group product share.  Instruments (4) and (5) 
respectively measure the average and sum of itinerary inconvenience associated with products 
offered by an airline in a market.  Recall that itinerary inconvenience is a flight distance-based 
measure we previously defined in the data section.  In addition, recall that for the nested logit 
demand model we group products by airline.  Since passengers may prefer the set of products 
offered by an airline in a market because these products offer relatively more convenient travel 
itineraries, then it is likely that within group share is correlated with instruments (4) and (5).  
Similarly, instrument (6) is likely to be correlated with within group share because passengers 
may prefer a set of products offered by a particular airline to other airlines’ products owing to 
differences in number of intermediate stops associated with the products.  The validity of 
instruments (4) – (6) rely on the reasonable, and often used, assumption that non-price product 
characteristics are medium to long-run decision variables, and therefore are pre-determined in 
the short-run, which implies that these non-price characteristics are uncorrelated with     .   
1.7 Estimation Results for Demand, Markup and Marginal Cost 
 Demand Results 
Table 1.6 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimates of the nested logit demand model.  Recall that      and            are likely to be 
endogenous, which is not taken in account by OLS estimates.  The coefficient estimate on price 
in the OLS regression is unusually small and statistically insignificant.  Although the OLS and 
2SLS coefficient estimates on            lie between zero and one as required by utility 
maximization theory, they are very different in size.  We perform Hausman tests, reported in the 
last row of Table 1.6, to assess the endogeneity of these variables.  The results of these 
endogeneity tests show that we can reject the hypothesis that    and          are exogenous.  
Therefore, instruments are needed.  As a check on how well the instruments can explain 
                                                 
14
 See Villas-Boas (2007) for similarly motivated types of instruments.  
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variations in the endogenous variables, we regress each endogenous variable against the 
instruments using OLS.  R
2
 measures for the regressions of price against instruments and within 
group product share against instruments are 0.20 and 0.49 respectively, which suggest that the 
instruments can explain variations in the endogenous variables.  
Based on the clear need to instrument for price and within group product shares, we now 
turn to the 2SLS estimation results for discussion.  The coefficient on price now has the correct 
sign (negative) and its magnitude has increased.  The magnitude of the coefficient on the within 
group product share becomes smaller and approaches zero rather than one.  This suggests that 
although consumers do exhibit some loyalty to respective airlines, their loyalty is not as strong.  
Nonetheless, both coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels.   
Consistent with what we expect, the coefficient on the Interstop variable is negative, 
which indicates that consumer’s utility decreases as the number of intermediate stop(s) increases.  
The Inconvenience variable is the ratio of itinerary distance to nonstop distance between the 
origin and destination city.  The intuition is that two itineraries can have the same number of 
intermediate stop(s), but depending on differences across the two itineraries in where the 
intermediate stop(s) is(are) relative to the origin and destination cities, the two itineraries may 
yield different levels of travel convenience for the passenger (Gayle 2007).  Therefore, this 
variable captures aspects of the itinerary inconvenience that the variable Interstop does not.  As 
expected, the coefficient associated with the Inconvenience variable is negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that, among itineraries with equivalent number of intermediate stop(s), 
passengers prefer itineraries with intermediate stop(s) that best minimize travel distances.   
The positive coefficient on the Origin presence variable suggests that all else equal, 
passengers’ utilities are higher when an airline offers nonstop service to more cities from the 
passengers’ local airport.  In other words, consumers are more likely to choose air travel 
products offered by the airline that serves the larger number of destinations via nonstop flight 
from the consumer’s origin city’s airport.  This result can be interpreted as capturing a “hub-
size” effect on air travel demand.  Positive marginal utility associated with “hub-size” may 
indicate that consumers are possibly reaping the benefits from these airlines in the form of better 
services such as convenient departure times, gate locations or benefits from participating in 
frequent flyer programs.  
26 
 
The coefficients on the dummy variables for different seasons suggest that air travel 
demand display seasonal variations.  Specifically, air travel demand seems to be highest in 
Spring and Summer, which accords with our expectation.     
Our demand model yields a mean own-price elasticity estimate of -1.89.  Oum, Gillen 
and Noble (1986), and Brander and Zhang (1990) argue that a reasonable range for own price 
elasticity in the airline industry is from -1.2 to -2.0.  Berry and Jia (2010) find own-price 
elasticity estimates ranging from -1.89 to -2.10 in their 2006 sample, while Peters (2006) study 
of the airline industry produces own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -3.2 to -3.6.  
Although our elasticity estimate is on the lower range, we believe that it is reasonable and 
accords with evidence in the existing literature. 
Table 1.6 Demand Estimation Results 
647,167 observations:  2005-Q1 to 2011-Q3 
 OLS 2SLS 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Price -2.96e-5 (2.75e-5) -0.0110*** (0.0001) 
         0.4990*** (0.0011) 0.0843*** (0.0023) 
Interstop -0.9528*** (0.0034) -1.2536*** (0.0045) 
Inconvenience -0.9927*** (0.0063) -1.1236*** (0.0076) 
Origin presence 0.0147*** (0.0001) 0.0117*** (0.0001) 
Spring 0.1451*** (0.0034) 0.1648*** (0.0041) 
Summer 0.1294*** (0.0034) 0.1546*** (0.0041) 
Fall 0.1037*** (0.0036) 0.1059*** (0.0043) 
Constant -4.6684*** (0.0284) -2.6787*** (0.0361) 
Operating carrier effects YES YES 
Origin airport effects YES YES 
Destination airport effects YES YES 
Year effects YES YES 
   0.5768 0.3927 
Wu-Hausman:                            28950.4***   F(2;  647,002)     Prob_Value = 0.0000 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman:               53158.4***                          Prob_Value = 0.0000 
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 Computed Variable Profits and Recovered Marginal Costs 
All monetary variables in this study are measured in constant year 1999 dollars.  The 
overall mean price and product markup are $165.90 and $92.82, respectively.  We find that 
airlines are able to raise their price above marginal cost by a mean 60.80%.  Mean product-level 
marginal cost is $73.08.  The mean number of miles flown on an itinerary in the sample is 
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1,544.25 miles (see summary statistics for “Market miles flown” variable in Table 3).  Therefore, 
our model predicts a marginal cost per mile of 4.7 cents. 
Quarterly market-level variable profits by airline are computed using equation (9) along 
with the demand parameter estimates.  It is useful at this point to put in context the magnitudes 
of quarterly market-level variable profit estimates.  Recall that the original database, before any 
cleaning, is only a 10% sample of air travel tickets sold.  This implies that the magnitudes of 
variable profit estimates are at most roughly 10% of actual variable profits.  Mean quarterly 
market-level variable profit for an airline in the sample is $84,188.81, while the median is 
$33,451.05. 
 Product markup function estimation results 
 Table 1.7 reports estimation results for a regression in which a variable of product 
markups generated from the structural model is regressed on several determinants of markup, 
including the relevant dummy variables needed to investigate how product markup change with 
implementation of each respective merger.  The variables of interest are   
         and 
  
         .  Their coefficients indicate whether product markups are any different over the 
relevant pre-post merger periods for each merger.   
 As expected, the positive coefficient estimate on the   
         variable suggests that 
the DL/NW merger is associated with higher markup for the products offered by the newly 
merged DL/NW airline.  However, the economic magnitude of the coefficient is small.  Markup 
for products offered by DL/NW only increases by an average 65 cents following the merger, 
which corresponds to a 0.70% increase over these airlines’ pre-merger mean markup.  While the 
coefficient estimate on   
         is also positive, it is statistically insignificant suggesting 
that markups for UA/CO products are not different over the pre-post merger periods.  
 Other control variables in the markup regression include: (i) size of an airline’s presence 
at the origin airport, measured by the Origin presence variable; and (ii) the number of 
intermediate stops required by a flight itinerary, measured by the Interstop variable.  As 
expected, Origin presence has a positive effect on product markup, which is consistent with the 
argument in the literature that airlines are able to charge a premium at their hub airport [Berry 
(1990); Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006); Borenstein (1989)].  An increase in the number of 
intermediate stops in a product reduces markup.  This result is also expected because passengers 
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usually prefer nonstop flights to their destinations, as confirmed by our demand equation 
estimation results.   
 In summary, both mergers increase markup but the economic magnitude is negligible.  
Since product markup measures market power, these results suggest that the mergers, on 
average, did not reduce the level of competition in the industry. 
Table 1.7 Estimation Results for Product Markup Regressed on Several of its Determinants   






   -0.2260*** 0.0576     
  
         0.6506*** 0.0514     
  
   0.1650*** 0.0517      
  
         0.0258    0.0483      
Origin presence 0.0606*** 0.0004    
Interstop -1.3308*** 0.0682    
Constant 89.6996*** 0.0660   
Operating carrier effects YES 
Origin city effects YES 
Destination city effects YES 
Quarter and Year effects YES 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level, while * statistically significant at the 10% 
level.  Model is estimated using ordinary least squares. 
 Marginal cost function estimation results 
Table 1.8 presents OLS estimates of the marginal cost equation.  The coefficient on 
Itinerary distance flown (from origin to destination) has the expected positive sign and is 
statistically significant.  All else equal, marginal cost increases by $3.77 with each 100 miles 
increment in distance flown.   
The sign pattern of the coefficients on the airport presence variables suggest that 
marginal cost initially increases in airport presence, then eventually declines with further 
increases in airport presence.  The coefficients on the airport presence variables can be 
interpreted as capturing the effect of “hub-size” on marginal cost.  In other words, coefficients on 
the “hub-size” variables indicate that airlines will not be able to achieve marginal cost 
efficiencies until they reach a certain scale of operation.  Therefore, we believe these variables 
indirectly capture economies of passenger-traffic densities that airlines can enjoy by channeling a 
relatively large volume of passengers through these endpoint airports.  
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Brueckner and Spiller (1994), in an earlier study, find robust direct evidence of 
economies of passenger-traffic densities.  They use a structural econometric model to show that 
marginal cost per passenger on a route falls as airlines channel high volumes of passengers on 
segments of the route.      
Relative to the DL/NW pre-merger time period, there is no evidence that marginal costs 
for non-DL/NW products change in the post-merger period.  However, the DL/NW merger is 
associated with a decline of $7.5 in the marginal cost of DL/NW products.  These inferences are 
drawn from the coefficients on   
   and   
         respectively.  Therefore, the results 
suggest that there are marginal cost efficiencies associated with the DL/NW merger. 
Table 1.8 Marginal Cost Estimation Results  






Itinerary distance flown (miles) 0.0377*** 0.0001    
Origin presence 0.4549*** 0.0087     
(Origin presence)
2
 -0.0004*** 0.0001     
Dest. presence 0.4849*** 0.0088 
(Dest. presence)
2
 -0.0006*** 0.0001     
  
   0.0949 0.3398      
  
         -7.5935*** 0.3180    
  
   1.0132*** 0.3013      
  
         -14.6084*** 0.5389 
Constant 23.0705*** 1.2079     
Operating carrier effects YES 
Origin city effects YES 
Destination city effects YES 
Quarter and Year effects YES 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
There is strong evidence that the UA/CO merger lowers marginal cost even more than the 
DL/NW merger.  Marginal cost of non-UA/CO products seem to be higher comparing UA/CO 
pre-merger and post-merger time periods.  However, the marginal cost of United/Continental 
products seems to decline substantially (approximately $13.60=($1.01-$14.61)) when comparing 
the pre-merger and post-merger periods.   
In summary, there are marginal cost efficiencies associated with both mergers, but the 
magnitude of the marginal cost decrease associated with the UA/CO merger is greater than that 
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associated with the DL/NW merger.  These marginal cost efficiency gains closely reflect the 
reduced-form price effects of the mergers reported in Table 5.  
1.8 Estimation of Dynamic Model 
Consider the following pseudo log likelihood function:  
  
              
             
        
  
                       
        
  
       
 
   
 
   ,  (21) 
 
where       is called the “pseudo” log likelihood function because players’ conditional choice 
probabilities (CCPs) in   are arbitrary and do not represent the equilibrium probabilities 
associated with   implied by the model.  We begin by implementing a two-step pseudo 
maximum likelihood estimator (PML).  The first step involves estimating the relevant state 
transition equations and obtaining nonparametric estimates of the choice probabilities,    .  
Estimating the state transition equations allow us to construct the state transition matrices,    
     
and    
    .15  Nonparametric estimates of choice probabilities allow us to construct consistent 
estimates of      
   and      
   .       
   and      
    are components of expected profit, which we define in 
Appendix B.  With    
    ,    
    ,      
    and      
     in hand, we can construct the pseudo log 
likelihood function,         .   
 In the second step, we estimate the vector of parameters by solving the following 
problem: 
  
             
 
        ,       (22) 
 
 where       is the two-step pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PML).  The 
computation in the second step is simple as it only involves estimation of a standard discrete 
choice model.  The main advantage of the two-step estimator is its computational simplicity 
because it does not require solving for an equilibrium in the dynamic game, which greatly 
                                                 
15
 To facilitate construction of the transition matrices, continuous state variables are discretized.  The two continuous 
state variables are, variable profit (    
 ), and size of an airline’s presence at endpoint airports of a market (       ).  
    








 percentiles of the continuous variable, while 






 percentiles of the continuous variable. 
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reduces the computational burden.  However, as discussed in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), 
the two-step PML estimator may be subjected to finite sample bias.  To deal with such potential 
bias, we follow Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and implement a recursive K-step extension of 
the two-step PML estimator, which they refer to as the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) 
estimator.
 16
  In Appendix C we provide more discussion on implementing the NPL estimator. 
 Fixed and Entry Cost Estimation Results 
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 present our recurrent fixed and sunk market entry cost estimation 
results for the two mergers.  We begin by discussing recurrent fixed cost results for both mergers 
and then turn to discussing sunk market entry cost results.  First, the parameters that measure 
mean fixed cost as well as coefficients on the size of an airline’s airport presence—measured by 
the mean number of destinations that an airline connects from the market’s endpoint airports 
using non-stop flight—are unreasonably small and not precisely estimated.  We expected these 
coefficients to be positive, reflecting that mean fixed cost is positive and increasing in the size of 
an airline’s operations at the market endpoint airports.  The reason for this expected result is that, 
the larger the size of an airline’s operations at an airport, the more gates and ground crew the 
airline will need for operations, which imply higher fixed expenses.   
  
                                                 
16
 While the demand model is estimated using all years in the data set (2005Q1-2011Q3), due to significant 
computational burden, we find that the dynamic entry/exit model can only feasibly be estimated using, at most, four 
quarters of the data.  Even with just four quarters of data, the computer code for the dynamic entry/exit model took 
more than two weeks of continuous running before convergence is achieved. 
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Table 1.9 Recurrent Fixed and Sunk Market Entry Cost Functions Parameter Estimates 
for the Sample used to Evaluate the United/Continental Merger 
Pre-merger period - 2009:Q1-Q2: Post-merger period - 2011:Q1-Q2 





Fixed Cost Function    
Mean Fixed Cost 7.52e-12 0.0051 1.49e-9 
            5.34e-13 9.49e-5 5.63e-09 
      -0.6479*** 0.0584 -11.08 
  
   2.23e-11 0.0055 4.06e-09 
  
         -1.8462*** 0.1656 -11.15 
Entry Cost Function    
Mean Entry Cost 3.1129*** 0.0361 86.29 
            -0.0113*** 0.0004 -29.14 
      0.9994*** 0.0742 13.46 
  
   -0.2762*** 0.0458 -6.03 
  
         3.0569*** 0.2089 14.63 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Table 1.10 Recurrent Fixed and Sunk Market Entry Cost Functions Parameter Estimates 
for the Sample used to Evaluate the Delta/Northwest Merger 






Fixed Cost Function    
Mean Fixed Cost 8.51e-05 0.0278 0.0031 
            -5.86e-07 0.0003 -0.0019 
      -0.5478*** 0.0538 -10.19 
  
   -6.77e-07 0.0318 -2.13e-05 
  
         -2.7602*** 0.2055 -13.43 
Entry Cost Function    
Mean Entry Cost 3.0993*** 0.0409 75.83 
            -0.0119*** 0.0004 -27.72 
      0.5802*** 0.0679 8.54 
  
   0.2138** 0.0541 3.95 
  
         2.7363*** 0.2248 12.17 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. 
The fixed cost function coefficient estimates on dummy variable       in Table 1.9 and 
dummy variable       in Table 1.10 are both negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels of statistical significance.  The negative coefficient on       suggests that 
over the pre- and post-merger sample periods used for evaluating the UA/CO merger, United and 
Continental Airlines have lower mean fixed cost relative to the mean fixed cost across other 
airlines.  The coefficient estimate suggests that, for a typical origin-destination market during the 
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relevant sample period, the mean quarterly fixed cost of Continental and United Airlines is 
approximately $6,479 lower than the mean quarterly fixed cost across other airlines.  Similarly, 
the negative coefficient on       suggests that over the pre- and post-merger sample periods 
used for evaluating the DL/NW merger, Delta and Northwest Airlines have lower mean quarterly 
fixed cost relative to the mean quarterly fixed cost across other airlines.  The coefficient estimate 
suggests that, for a typical origin-destination market during the relevant sample period, the mean 
quarterly fixed cost of Delta and Northwest Airlines is approximately $5,478 lower than the 
mean quarterly fixed cost across other airlines.  
The fixed cost function coefficient on variable   
   in Table 1.9 and variable   
   in Table 
1.10 measure the extent to which non-merging airlines’ fixed cost change between the respective 
pre- and post-merger periods under consideration.  The coefficients on   
   and   
   are not 
statistically different from zero in both cases, suggesting that non-merging airlines’ fixed cost did 
not change between the respective pre- and post-merger periods under consideration.  
 The fixed cost function coefficients on the interaction variables   
         and 
  
         in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 respectively, measure if the merging airlines cost change is 
different relative to other airlines between the respective pre- and post-merger periods.  
Therefore, these coefficients capture possible merger efficiencies with respect to fixed costs.  
The coefficients on both interaction terms are negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
that both airline mergers have fixed cost savings associated with it.  The coefficient estimates 
suggest that the UA/CO and DL/NW mergers reduce these airlines quarterly fixed cost by an 
average $18,462 and $27,602 respectively in the typical origin-destination market served by 
these carriers.  Therefore, the fixed cost efficiency gains from the DL/NW merger are greater in 
magnitude compare to the UA/CO merger. 
We now turn to discussing the results on market entry costs.  All the variables that enter 
the entry cost function are the same as the variables in the fixed cost function.  The coefficient 
estimates in the entry cost functions in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 are all statistically significant at the 
one percent level.  The one-time mean cost to enter a market is approximately $31,000 on 
average across all airlines in both samples.  Based on the static model estimates previously 
discussed, the median quarterly variable profit an airline earns in an origin-destination market is 
approximately  $33,450.  Therefore, our models suggest that the size of the mean entry cost takes 
up almost the entire (92.68%) one-period median variable profit. 
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The entry cost function coefficient on the size of market endpoint airport presence across 
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 are both negative as expected.  In other words, greater endpoint airport 
presence seems to lower the airlines’ entry cost to begin actually serving the market.  This result 
is consistent with much of the airline literature that discusses the determinants of market entry 
[for example see Berry (1992) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008)].  
The entry cost coefficient estimates on dummy variable       in Table 1.9 and dummy 
variable       in Table 1.10 are both positive.  The positive coefficient on       suggests that 
over the pre- and post-merger sample periods used for evaluating the UA/CO merger, United and 
Continental Airlines have higher mean entry cost relative to the mean entry cost across other 
airlines.  The coefficient estimate suggests that, for a typical origin-destination market during the 
relevant sample period, the mean entry cost of Continental and United Airlines is approximately 
$9,994 higher than the mean entry cost across other airlines.  Similarly, the positive coefficient 
on       suggests that over the pre- and post-merger sample periods used for evaluating the 
DL/NW merger, Delta and Northwest Airlines have higher mean entry cost relative to the mean 
entry cost across other airlines.  The coefficient estimate suggests that, for a typical origin-
destination market during the relevant sample period, the mean entry cost of Delta and 
Northwest Airlines is approximately $5,802 higher than the mean entry cost across other airlines. 
The entry cost function coefficient on variable   
   in Table 1.9 and variable   
   in Table 
1.10 measure the extent to which non-merging airlines’ market entry cost change between the 
respective pre- and post-merger periods under consideration.  The negative coefficient on   
   
suggests that non-merging airlines’ market entry cost fell between the pre- and post-merger 
sample periods used to evaluate the UA/CO merger.  On the contrary, the positive coefficient on 
  
    suggests that non-merging airlines’ market entry cost increase between the pre- and post-
merger sample periods used to evaluate the DL/NW merger.  All else equal, non-merging 
airlines’ market entry costs increase about $2,138 after DL and NW merged, however non-
merging airlines’ market entry cost fall about $2,762 after UA and CO merged.  
Although we have found evidence of fixed cost savings, we are also interested in 
knowing whether those mergers lower the merging firms’ market entry costs.  Interestingly, the 
entry cost function coefficients on the interaction variables   
         and    
         in 
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 respectively, suggest that the merging airlines’ market entry costs rise as a 
result of the mergers.  The DL/NW merger increases DL and NW market entry costs by 
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approximately $27,363, while the UA/CO merger is associated with a larger increase in UA and 
CO market entry costs, approximately $30,569.  
In summary, we find evidence that fixed cost efficiency gains are associated with both 
mergers.  The DL/NW merger experiences a greater magnitude of reduction in fixed costs 
compare to the merger between United and Continental.  Market entry costs for the merging 
airlines however increased as a result of the mergers.  The UA/CO merger is associated with a 
larger increase in the merging airlines’ market entry cost as compared to the increase in the 
merging airlines’ entry cost associated with the DW/NW merger.  In the case of non-merging 
airlines, we find that their fixed costs are unchanged throughout the entire evaluation periods for 
both mergers.  However, non-merging airlines’ market entry cost increase after the DL/NW 
merger, but decrease after the UA/CO merger.    
1.9 Discussion 
Since merging airlines are likely to be more efficient with the use of their aircraft fleets, 
and handling of their airport operations, it is not surprising to find evidence of fixed costs 
savings, as we do, associated with the mergers.  However, we thought that the merging airlines’ 
market entry cost would also decline, rather than increase as the estimates suggest.  So the 
increase in the market entry cost of the merging airlines’ is a bit surprising.  One possible 
explanation for this may be related to the fixed cost efficiency gains that we found.  The 
argument is as follows.  With lower recurrent fixed cost, the merged airlines can now profitably 
operate in markets that are more costly to enter compared to the type of markets that they 
typically enter prior to the merger.  In other words, without the merger-specific fixed-cost 
efficiencies, entry into these markets may not have been possible otherwise.  In this case, the 
merging firms' new market entry choice behavior in the post-merger period reveals the higher 
entry cost markets that the merged firm is now entering.  This argument is consistent with data in 
Table 1.4, which indicate that in the post-merger period, UA/CO has entered into 65 new 
markets—markets where neither operated before merging.  Likewise, the table shows that 
DL/NW has entered into as many as 123 new markets—markets where neither operated before 
they merged.  Perhaps these markets are the high cost-to-enter markets where if it were not for 
the merger, they would not have entered.  
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An interesting result that merits further discussion is that non-merging airlines’ market 
entry cost increases following the DL/NW merger, but declines following the UA/CO.  In other 
words, rivals to the newly merged DL/NW airlines find it more difficult in the post-merger 
period to enter markets and possibly compete with the newly merged airline.  On the other hand, 
rivals to the newly merged UA/CO airline find it easier in the post-merger period to enter 
markets and possibly compete with the newly merged airline.  One implication of this result is 
that initial increases in market concentration due to the DL/NW merger might persist longer 
compared to initial increases in market concentration due to the UA/CO merger.  
1.10 Concluding Remarks 
Researchers have long been interested in measuring possible cost efficiency gains 
associated with mergers.  We are unaware of papers in the literature that explicitly separate 
merger cost effects into these three main categories of cost:  (1) marginal cost; (2) recurrent fixed 
cost; and (3) sunk entry cost.  Therefore, the main objective and contribution of our paper is to 
empirically estimate marginal, recurrent fixed and sunk entry cost effects associated with two 
recent airline mergers – Delta/Northwest and United/Continental mergers – using a methodology 
that does not require the researcher to have cost data. 
Our empirical results reveal that for the merging airlines:  (1) Marginal cost efficiency 
gains are associated with both DL/NW and UA/CO mergers; (2) Fixed cost efficiency gains are 
associated with both DL/NW and UA/CO mergers; (3) Both mergers however are associated 
with increased market entry costs; and (4) The magnitudes of these effects differ across the two 
mergers.  The magnitude of marginal cost savings associated with the DL/NW merger is smaller 
than that of the UA/CO merger.  In contrast, the magnitude of fixed cost savings associated with 
the DL/NW merger is greater than that of the UA/CO merger.  The magnitude of the increase in 
market entry costs associated with the UA/CO merger is greater than that of the DL/NW merger.  
In the case of non-merging airlines, we find that their fixed costs are unchanged throughout the 
entire evaluation periods for both mergers.  However, non-merging airlines’ market entry costs 
increase after the DL/NW merger, but decrease after the UA/CO merger.  One implication of this 
last result is that initial increases in market concentration due to the DL/NW merger might 
persist longer compared to initial increases in market concentration due to the UA/CO merger.  
37 
 
 We also estimate a regression in which a variable of product markups generated from the 
structural model is regressed on several determinants of markup.  Results from this product 
markup regression reveal that both mergers led to only small increases in markups, suggesting 
that market power effects of these mergers were negligible. 
Results from our structural model are consistent with results from a reduced-form price 
regression we estimate.  The reduced-form price regression reveals evidence that each merger is 
associated with price decreases, which suggests that marginal cost efficiencies outweigh market 
power increases.  However, the reduced-form price regression is not able to separately measure 
the magnitudes of marginal cost efficiencies and markup increases associated with the mergers, 
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Essay 2 - Airline Alliances and their Effects on Costs 
2.1 Introduction 
The prevalence of airline alliances among domestic carriers following passage of the 
Airline Deregulation Act in 1978 leads one to wonder the extent to which these alliances 
generate cost efficiency gains for the partner carriers.  Investigating the cost effects associated 
with an alliance is of particular interest since it is the traditional legacy carriers with hub-and-
spoke route networks that typically form alliances, and these carriers face increasingly stiff 
competition from low-cost-carriers.  The most common form of airline cooperation is a 
codesharing agreement that allows a carrier to put its designator code on its partners’ flights.  For 
example, DL001 is flight 001 operated by Delta.  The word operated here means that Delta is the 
airline that transports the passenger.  If Delta has a codesharing agreement with Northwest, this 
flight can also be marketed and sold by Northwest under the code and flight number NW002 
even though Northwest is not the operator of the flight.  Thus, a single flight can be ticketed and 
sold my multiple carriers even though the operator of the flight may be different from the one 
that sold the ticket.   
The literature on codeshare alliances is extensive.  Many facets have been examined such 
as their effects on airfares, passenger traffic, and social welfare [Brueckner and Whalen (2000); 
Brueckner (2001 and 2003); Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004); Ito and Lee (2007); 
Gayle (2007, 2008 and 2013); among others].
17
  Nonetheless, perhaps due to the difficulty of 
obtaining cost data at the route-level, few studies have looked into how airline alliances might 
influence costs.  Furthermore, even the few studies that did find that alliances have very little 
impact on costs.  For example, Goh and Yong (2006) estimate a translog cost function using 
firm-level data of 10 US airlines from 1994-2001 and find that the economic magnitude of the 
effect on cost is small.  A one percent increase in the number of alliance partners reduces total 
costs by only 0.029 percent.  In another study by Gagnepain and Marin (2010), they find that 
although being a member of an alliance on average lowers prices compared to airlines outside 
the alliance, there are no significant effects of the alliance on airlines' operating costs.  Also, 
Chen (2000) uses the American Productivity Centre (APC) model to empirically investigate the 
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(1998); and Park and Zhang (2000). 
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profitability of airlines that are members of an international alliance.  The author decomposes 
changes in airlines’ profitability into changes in their productivity and cost recovery, and finds 
that in terms of their ability to recover cost, no airline exhibited any significant improvement 
regardless of their involvement with other airlines or the size of their partner airlines.    
These studies examine cost as a whole (total cost), and even though they find that total 
cost seems to matter little as a motivating factor for airlines forming alliances, we think that 
perhaps there are differential changes in various components of costs that may mask cost effects 
if the analysis only focuses on total cost.  More importantly, a disaggregate cost analysis is very 
useful since changes in marginal cost, recurrent fixed cost, and sunk market entry cost are likely 
to affect equilibrium market outcomes differentially over different time horizons.  For example, 
theory tells us that a change in marginal cost will be reflected in price more quickly than changes 
in recurrent fixed or sunk market entry cost.  However, changes in recurrent fixed cost and sunk 
market entry cost are more likely to change the medium to long-run market structure 
configuration.  So a great deal of economic outcomes associated with an alliance could 
potentially be overlooked if analyses only focus on total cost when analyzing the cost effects of 
an alliance.   
But what is the rationale for positing that an alliance may influence various components 
of partner airlines’ cost, and why might these cost components be differentially affected?  Figure 
1 is used to help lay out the arguments why an alliance may influence the three types of costs we 
stated above. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates two separate hub-and-spoke (HS) route networks operated by 
Airline 1 and Airline 2 respectively.  Airline 1 has a hub airport in city H1 and serves spoke 
cities A, B and C via this hub.  Airline 2 has a hub airport in city H2 and serves spoke cities X, Y 
and Z via this hub.  Furthermore, suppose these two airlines are initially non-allied and each only 
provides service to their spoke cities via their respective hubs, H1 and H2. 
As suggested above, a codeshare alliance effectively allows a carrier to sell tickets for 
seats on its partners’ plane as if the carrier selling the seats owned these seats.  Suppose Airline 1 
and Airline 2 form a codeshare alliance, which incentivizes Airline 1 to begin operating a flight 
between its own hub H1 and Airline 2’s hub H2.  The dashed line in Figure 1 represents this new 
nonstop flight service by Airline 1 between cities H1 and H2.  Note that the codeshare alliance 
allows Airline 1 to use this single new nonstop flight to leverage the expansive reach of Airline 
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2’s route network.  In other words, by codesharing with Airline 2, Airline 1 can offer service to 
customers in its spoke cities A, B, and C to destinations X, Y and Z, where these customers will 
ride on Airline 1’s plane(s) up to city H2, then change over to Airline 2’s plane to get to their 
final destination.  So the codeshare alliance effectively allows Airline 1 to enter several new 
origin-destination markets more cheaply by leveraging its partners’ network, rather than having 
to use its own planes exclusively to enter these markets.  Therefore, this example illustrates that 
an alliance can decrease partner airlines’ market entry costs. 
 
Figure 2.1 Two Separate Hub-and-Spoke Route Networks 
By channeling passengers from different origins, who have a common destination, 
through the carrier’s intermediate-stop hub airport, these passengers can be put on a single plane 
in the last segment(s) of the trip to their destination.  Therefore, the HS network enables carriers 
to better fill their planes with passengers.  It is well documented in the literature that the HS 
route network structure enables carriers to exploit economies of passenger-traffic density, i.e., 
the marginal cost of transporting a passenger on a route is lower, the more passengers that the 
airline transports on segments of the route [Brueckner and Spiller (1994); and Keeler and 
Formby (1994)].   
Our example in Figure 1 can be used to illustrate that a codeshare alliance further enables 
partner carriers to exploit economies of passenger-traffic density.  The additional passenger-
traffic that is coming from Airline 1’s spoke cities A, B, and C that will now travel on Airline 2’s 
network for a segment of the trip to get to cities X, Y, and Z, will allow Airline 2 to better exploit 
economies of passenger-traffic density.  That is, Airline 2’s marginal cost of transporting a 
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passenger on its network is lower because of the higher volume of passengers it now transports 
due to the alliance.  Likewise, due to typical reciprocity of codeshare alliances, Airline 1 will 
also enjoy lower marginal cost on its network due to the additional passengers it will transport 
that originate in cities X, Y, and Z and traveling to destination cities A, B, and C by flying on 
both partners’ planes to complete the trip.      
Accommodating a higher volume of passengers may require partner carriers to acquire 
more airport gates and a larger airport staff to handle more intensive airport operations.  
Therefore, it is possible that partners’ recurrent fixed cost could increase as a result of the 
alliance.  On the other hand, it has been argued in the literature that since alliance partners often 
share their airport facilities (lounges, gates, check-in counters etc.), ground and flight personnel, 
this could result in more efficient use of airport facilities and staff, which could effectively yield 
recurrent fixed cost savings [Park (1997)].  The arguments therefore suggest that partner carriers’ 
recurrent fixed cost may either rise or fall due to the alliance.  
In summary, an alliance can cause partner carriers’ sunk market entry cost and marginal 
cost to fall, but recurrent fixed cost may either fall or rise.  If an alliance causes recurrent fixed 
cost to rise, while other components of cost fall, then an aggregated cost analysis may not 
capture the economically important ways that an alliance influences various cost components.  
Unfortunately, a challenge we face in studying these different types of cost effects that may be 
associated with an alliance is that cost data at the route-level are not readily available.   
Therefore, the main objective of our study is to estimate marginal, recurrent fixed, and 
sunk market entry costs effects associated with an airline alliance using a structural econometric 
model that does not require the researcher to have cost data. Our study offers two crucial 
distinguishing features from others in the literature.  First, our methodology does not require 
having actual cost data to draw inference on changes in cost associated with an alliance.  Second, 
our methodology separately identifies changes in economically relevant components of cost 
associated with an alliance.  
The short-run parts of our model allow us to draw inference on how economies of 
passenger-traffic density – measured indirectly by the size of an airline's presence at the market 
endpoint cities – might affect marginal cost of transporting a passenger.  Medium to long-run 
parts of our model are used to draw inference on changes in partner carriers’ recurrent fixed and 
sunk market entry costs associated with the alliance relative to non-alliance carriers.  We apply 
45 
 
our model to the Delta/Northwest/Continental (DNC hereafter) domestic alliance formed in 
2003.  Below is a brief summary of the methodology we use. 
We begin by specifying and estimating short-run demand and supply of air travel.  
Consumer demand is estimated via a discrete choice model.  For the short-run supply-side of the 
model, we assume that firms set prices according to a differentiated products Nash equilibrium in 
prices.  This assumption allows us to derive product-specific markups and recover product-level 
marginal cost.  With implied marginal cost estimates in hand, we specify and estimate marginal 
cost as a function of various regressors.  These regressors include time period and alliance-
specific dummy variables that allow us to compare how the marginal cost of products offered by 
Delta, Northwest and Continental changed across the DNC pre-post alliance periods relative to 
the marginal cost of products offered by other carriers.  Furthermore, to indirectly capture the 
role economies of passenger-traffic density might play, we allow changes in marginal cost to 
depend on the size of carriers’ presence at the endpoint airports of an origin-destination market. 
Product-specific markups from the Nash price-setting game part of the model enables us 
to compute firm-level variable profits in a market, which we use in the dynamic part of the 
model to examine the effects of the alliance on recurring fixed and sunk market entry costs.  The 
dynamic part of our model is an entry/exit game in which each airline chooses markets in which 
to be active during specific time periods in order to maximize its expected discounted stream of 
per-period profit.  Per-period profit is comprised of variable profit less per-period fixed cost and 
a one-time entry cost if the airline is not currently serving the market but plans to do so next 
period.  The dynamic entry/exit game allows us to estimate fixed and entry costs by exploiting 
estimates of variable profits previously computed from the Nash price-setting game along with 
observed data on airlines’ decisions to enter and exit certain markets.  We allow all firms' (both 
alliance and non-alliance firms) fixed and entry costs to change in the DNC post-alliance period 
relative to the pre-alliance period.  Consistent with a difference-in-differences identification 
strategy, we identify fixed and entry cost effects of the alliance by comparing pre-post alliance 
periods' changes in Delta, Northwest and Continental fixed and entry costs relative to changes in 
other airlines’ fixed and entry costs over these pre-post alliance periods. 
Our empirical results suggest that implementation of the DNC alliance resulted in:  (1) A 
decrease in marginal costs for the alliance partners in markets where the airlines have a large 
presence at their market endpoints; (2) A reduction in sunk market entry costs for the alliance 
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partners; and (3) The alliance however is associated with higher recurrent fixed costs for the 
partners.  The absolute magnitude of the increase in fixed cost is higher than that of the decrease 
in entry cost.  Interestingly, other firms’ recurrent fixed cost remain unchanged, while their 
market entry cost decreases over the DNC pre-post alliance periods.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  The next section presents some background 
information on the alliance.  Section 2.3 describes the data sample.  Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present 
the short-run demand and supply, as well as the dynamic parts of the model, respectively.  
Section 2.6 describes the estimation procedure of the short-run part of the model.  A brief 
discussion of those estimation results follows in section 2.7.  Section 2.8 describes the estimation 
method for the dynamic part of the model, and results from this estimation are discussed in 
section 2.9.  Section 2.10 concludes. 
2.2 Background Information on the DL/NW/CO alliance  
On August 23, 2002 three hub-and-spoke route network carriers, Delta, Northwest, and 
Continental, submit their alliance proposal to the Department of Transportation (DoT) for 
review.  This proposal requests a comprehensive alliance that involves codesharing, reciprocal 
frequent-flyer programs and reciprocal access to airport lounges.  Despite the claim by the 
airlines that the alliance will benefit consumers in the form of improved services and the 




The two major aspects of concerns are:  (1) substantially high combined market share of 
the three airlines; and (2) the large number of markets in which their service overlap.  First, at the 
time of the proposed alliance, the three airlines have a combined market share of 35 percent—18 
percent for Northwest and Continental combined, and 17 percent for Delta—measured by 
domestic revenue passenger miles.  Therefore, the high combined market share of the three 
carriers is significant when compared to the 23 percent market share of the United/US Airways 
alliance that was in operation at the time.  Second, the three airlines’ services overlapped in 
3,214 markets, accounting for approximately 58 million annual passengers.  This number of 
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overlapping markets is substantial when compared to the United/US Airways alliance, which 
only had 543 overlapping markets and 15.1 million annual passengers.  
As a result of these facts, regulators were not convinced that the alliance will have many 
positive effects on consumers nor on the airlines in the form of cost savings.  Instead, the alliance 
can potentially create barriers to entry based on their significantly high combined market share.    
In the DoT’s initial review of the proposed alliance, it remarked that the alliance would:  
 
“Create neither substantial operating efficiencies nor substantial cost reductions for the three 
airlines” and “at many cities the alliance’s impact on the prospects of entry by competing 
airlines would be substantially equivalent to the impact that a single airline’s dominance would 
have at that city.”  
 
In order to mitigate these concerns, the DoT outlined several conditions that should be 
met before the airlines could implement their alliance.  These conditions are meant to limit 
potential collusion, size of market presence, joint marketing efforts that could prevent 
competition from other carriers, “hoarding” of airport facilities, and “crowding-out” of other 
airlines from computer reservation system displays.
 19
  A separate review by the Department of 
Justice (DoJ) was also conducted, and it came to the conclusion that the alliance “could result in 
lower fares and better service for passengers”.
20
  However, alliance partners cannot codeshare on 
each other’s flights wherever they offer competing nonstop service.  
In the end the airlines agreed to modifications that satisfied regulators and the alliance 
was allowed to go through.  The airlines began their codeshare alliance in June, 2003. 
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2.3 Definitions, Data Construction and Descriptive Statistics  
  Definitions  
 A market is directional and defined as a combination of origin and destination cities.  For 
example, air travel from Los Angeles to New York is considered a different market than air 
travel from New York to Los Angeles.  Defining a market this way allows us to capture 
heterogeneity in demographics across origin cities.   
 An itinerary specifies the origin, destination, and intermediate-stop(s) cities of the trip.  
For example, a passenger wanting to travel from Los Angeles to New York may have the option 
to consider two distinct travel itineraries: (1) a nonstop flight from Los Angeles to New York;  or 
(2) an itinerary that requires one intermediate stop in St. Louis, i.e., Los Angeles to St. Louis, 
then St. Louis to New York.   
 Each flight on an itinerary has a ticketing carrier and an operating carrier.  The ticketing 
carrier is the airline that sells the ticket for the seat, whereas the operating carrier is the airline 
that transports the passenger on its plane.  A product is a unique combination of ticketing 
carrier(s), operating carrier(s), and itinerary.  Similar to Gayle (2008), we focus on three types of 
air travel products:  pure online; traditional codeshare; and virtual codeshare.
21
  
 Table 2.1 provides examples of the three different types of products, each using an 
itinerary that requires travel from Atlanta (ATL) to Los Angeles (LAX) with one stop in Houston 
(IAH).  In the case of a pure online product, the same airline is the ticketing and operating carrier 
on all segments of the trip.  Note Delta is the ticketing carrier for both segments of the trip, 
denoted by  DL:DL in the table.  Furthermore, Delta is also the operating carrier for both 
segments of the trip—Atlanta to Houston and Houston to Los Angeles. 
 
Table 2.1 Examples of Airline Product Type 







Pure Online DL:DL DL:DL ATL IAH LAX 
Traditional Codeshare DL:DL DL:CO ATL IAH LAX 
Virtual Codeshare DL:DL CO:CO ATL IAH LAX 
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49 
 
 Codeshare products are identified as those having different ticketing and operating 
carriers.  There are two types of codeshare products:  (1) Traditional Codeshare; and (2) Virtual 
Codeshare.  A traditional codeshare product is defined as having a single ticketing carrier, but 
multiple operating carriers, one of which is the ticketing carrier.  Referring to the table, while 
Delta is the ticketing carrier for both segments, it only operates on the first leg of the trip.  
Continental (CO) operates the Houston to Los Angeles leg.  A virtual codeshare product is 
defined as having the same operating carrier for all segments of the trip, but the ticketing carrier 
is different from the operating carrier.  The key distinction between a traditional and a virtual 
codeshare product is that the operating carrier does not change across trip segments in a virtual 
codeshare product, while the operating carrier changes across trip segments in a traditional 
codeshare product. 
 Data Construction  
 The data we use come from the Office of Airline Information of the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics.  The dataset is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B).  
DB1B is a 10 percent sample of all airline tickets issued by carriers in the United States.  Each 
observation in the dataset is an itinerary.  It includes information such as: (i) the identities of 
origin, destination, and intermediate stop(s) airports on an itinerary; (ii) the identities of ticketing 
and operating carriers on the itinerary; (iii) the price of the ticket; (iv) the number of passengers 
who bought the ticket at that price; (v) total itinerary distance flown from origin to destination; 
and (vi) the nonstop distance between the origin and destination.  The data are quarterly.  Since 
the DNC alliance was implemented in June 2003, we use the third and fourth quarters of 2002 as 
the pre-alliance period and the third and fourth quarters of 2004 as the post-alliance period. 
Following Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), we focus on air travel between the 65 largest 
US cities based on the Census Bureau's Population Estimates Program (PEP), which produces 
estimates of population for the United States.  We use data from the category “Cities and 
Towns”.  We group cities that belong to the same metropolitan areas and share the same airport.  
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provides a list of the cities and corresponding airport groupings.  As in Berry, 
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Carnall and Spiller (2006) and Berry and Jia (2010), we use the geometric mean of a market's 
origin city population and destination city population as a measure of market size.
22
   
In selecting itineraries for estimation, we drop all itineraries with real prices less than $50 
or greater than $2,000.  Eliminating fares that are too low helps avoid discounted fares that may 
be due to passengers using their frequent-flyer miles to offset the full price of the trip.  We also 
drop itineraries with the following characteristics:  (i) travel outside the 48 mainland U.S.; (ii) 
one-way tickets; (iii) more than two intermediate stops; and (iv) if there are multiple ticketing 
carriers. 
Table 2.2 Cities, Airports and Population 






 LGA, JFK, EWR 8,606,988 8,682,908 
Los, Angeles, CA LAX, BUR 3,786,010 3,796,018 
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW 2,886,634 2,848,996 
Dallas, TX
2
 DAL, DFW 2,362,046 2,439,703 
Houston, TX HOU, IAH, EFD 2,002,144 2,058,645 
Phoenix, AZ
3
 PHX 1,951,642 2,032,803 
Philadelphia, PA PHL 1,486,712 1,514,658 
San Antonio, TX SAT 1,192,591 1,239,011 
San Diego, CA SAN 1,251,808 1,274,878 
San Jose, CA SJC 896,076 901,283 
Denver-Aurora, CO DEN 841,722 848,227 
Detroit, MI DTW 922,727 924,016 
San Francisco, CA SFO 761,983 773,284 
Jacksonville, FL JAX 758,513 778,078 
Indianapolis, IN IND 783,028 787,198 
Austin, TX AUS 671,486 696,384 
Columbus, OH CMH 723,246 735,971 
Charlotte, NC CLT 577,191 614,446 
Memphis, TN MEM 674,478 681,573 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN MSP 660,771 653,872 
Boston, MA BOS 585,366 607,367 
Baltimore, MD BWI 636,141 641,004 
Raleigh-Durham, NC RDU 503,524 534,599 
El Paso, TX ELP 574,337 582,952 
Seattle, WA SEA 570,166 570,961 
1 New York-Newark-Jersey; 
2Dallas-Arlington-Fort Worth-Plano, TX 
3 Phoenix-Temple-Mesa, AZ 
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integer such that the outside good share          
 
     in each market remains positive.  In our data set the 




Table 2.3 Cities, Airports and Population Continued 




Nashville, TN BNA 544,375 570,068 
Milwaukee, WI MKE 589,975 601,081 
Washington, DC DCA, IAD 564,643 579,976 
Las Vegas, NV LAS 506,695 534,168 
Louisville, KY SDF 553,049 558,389 
Portland, OR PDX 537,752 533,120 
Oklahoma City, OK OKC 518,516 526,939 
Tucson, AZ TUS 501,332 517,246 
Atlanta, GA ATL 419,476 468,839 
Albuquerque, NM ABQ 464,178 486,319 
Kansas City, MO MCI 443,390 458,618 
Sacramento, CA SMF 433,801 446,295 
Long Beach, CA LGB 470,398 470,620 
Omaha, NE OMA 399,081 426,549 
Miami, FL MIA 371,953 378,946 
Cleveland, OH CLE 468,126 455,798 
Oakland, CA OAK 401,348 394,433 
Colorado Springs, CO COS 369,945 388,097 
Tula, OK TUL 390,991 382,709 
Wichita, KS ICT 354,306 353,292 
St. Louis, MO STL 347,252 350,705 
New Orleans, LA MSY 472,540 461,915 
Tampa, FL TPA 315,151 320,713 
Santa Ana, CA SNA 341,411 339,319 
Cincinnati, OH CVG 322,278 331,717 
Pittsburg, PA PIT 327,652 320,394 
Lexington, KY LEX 262,706 274,581 
Buffalo, NY BUF 287,469 281,757 
Norfolk, VA ORF 238,343 241,979 
Ontario, CA ONT 164,734 168,068 
    
 Collapsing the Data 
 Each quarter contains millions of itineraries.  The data contain many identical itineraries 
that have different prices and the number of passengers who bought them at each of these prices.  
Therefore, for each time period, we aggregate the number of passengers and average the prices 
across unique itinerary-airline(s) combinations, which creates the quantity sold and price for 
each defined product.  
 Because we only want the set of unique itinerary-airline(s) combinations for each quarter, 
we collapse the data by our product definition.  Each product appears only once in the collapsed 





  The four quarters of cleaned data contain a total of 152,983 products across 2,898 
markets. 
 Creation of Other variables 
 In the collapsed dataset we create a few more variables.  The observed product share 
variable is created by dividing quantity sold by the market size.  Measured non-price product 
characteristic variables include:  Interstop; Inconvenience; and Opres_demand.  Interstop counts 
the numbers of intermediate stops in a product.  This variable constitutes one measure of the 
travel inconvenience embodied in a product’s itinerary.  Inconvenience is a distance-based 
measure of the “directness” of travel between the origin and destination that is embodied in a 
product’s itinerary.  This variable is computed by dividing a product’s itinerary distance flown 
by the nonstop flight distance between the origin and destination.  Therefore, the Inconvenience 
variable has a minimum value of 1, which corresponds to a product that uses a single nonstop 
flight from the origin to destination. 
 The Opres_demand variable counts the number of different cities that an airline provides 
service to via a nonstop flight from the origin airport of the market.  Figure 2.2 provides an 
illustration of this variable for a given airline.  In the figure, each arrow represents a different 
city to which the airline provides service leaving from the origin of the market.  In this case the 
Opres_demand  variable for the airline takes a value of 5.  The Opres_demand variable is 
intended to help explain consumers' choice between airlines that offer service from the 
consumers' origin city.  
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Figure 2.2 Illustration of Opres_demand variable 
 We create two additional variables that measure the size of an airline's presence at the 
market endpoints.  The variables are, Opres_cost and Dpres_cost.  Opres_cost counts number of 
different cities that an airline offers nonstop flights from going into the origin city of the market, 
while Dpres_cost counts the number of different cities that an airline flies to from the destination 
city of the market using nonstop flight.  Figure 2.3 provides an illustration of each of these 
variables for a given airline.  In the figure, each arrow pointing towards the origin city represents 
a different city from which the airline provides service going into the origin of the market.  In 
this case the Opres_cost variable for the airline takes a value of 4.  On the other hand, each arrow 
pointing away from the destination city represents a different city to which the airline provides 
service leaving from the destination of the market.  In this case the Dpres_cost variable for the 
airline takes a value of 6.  These two size-of-presence variables are intended to indirectly capture 
an airlines' ability to benefit from economies of passenger-traffic density in a given origin-
destination market, and therefore the variables are intended to help capture cost effects. 
 


















 Dummy variables for quarter, year, origin, destination, and carrier are created to capture 
unobserved product characteristics that vary across time period, origins, destinations, and 
carriers.  Recall that even though a product may have more than one operating carriers, it has 
only one ticketing carrier.  We use the ticketing carrier as the airline that “owns” the product. 
 In order to properly identify the different type of products—pure online, traditional 
codeshare, and virtual codeshare—we recode regional feeder carriers to have their major 
carriers’ code.  For example, a product that involves Delta (DL) and Comair Delta Connection 
(OH), where one of them is the ticketing carrier and the other the operating carrier, Comair Delta 
Connection is recoded as Delta.  Without recoding, this product would mistakenly be considered 
a codeshare product because the ticketing and operating carriers are different.  Once this 
recoding is done, dummy variables for product types are created.  
 Finally, we create three variables that pertain to the DNC alliance: Post-Alliance; 
DNC_demand; and DNC_mc.  Post-Alliance is a zero-one time period dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 to indicate the post-alliance period—the third and fourth quarters of 2004.   
DNC_demand is a zero-one dummy variable that equals to 1 for products that have either Delta, 
Northwest or Continental as a ticketing carrier.  DNC_mc is a zero-one dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 only for products whose operating carrier or operating carrier group is a subset 
of Delta, Continental, or Northwest.  The DNC_demand variable is included as a regressor in the 
demand equation, while DNC_mc is more appropriate for the marginal cost equation. 
 Table 2.4 lists all the carriers in the dataset according to the type of products they offer.  
While there are 24 airlines that offer pure online products, only 10 are involved in codeshare—
traditional or virtual—products.  Although regional feeder carriers such as Horizon (QX) and 
Chautauqua Airlines (RP) are not involved in codeshare products, because we have assigned 
them to their major carriers’ codes, they do offer pure online products where they sell tickets and 




Table 2.4 List of Airlines in the Data 
Airlines Involved in Pure Online Products Airlines Involved in Codeshare Products 
Airline Name Code Airline Name Code 
American Airlines Inc. AA American Airlines Inc. AA 
Aloha Air Cargo AQ Alaska Airlines Inc. AS 
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS Continental Air Lines Inc. CO 
JetBlue Airways B6 Delta Air Lines Inc. DL 
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO Frontier Airlines Inc. F9 
Delta Air Lines Inc. DL AirTran Airways Corp. FL 
Frontier Airlines Inc. F9 Northwest Airlines Inc. NW 
AirTran Airways Corp. FL ATA Airlines TZ 
Allegiant Air G4 United Air Lines Inc. UA 
Hawaiian Airlines Inc. HA US Airways Inc. US 
America West Airlines Inc. HP   
National Airlines N7   
Vanguard Airlines Inc. NJ   
Spirit Air Lines NK   
Northwest Airlines Inc. NW   
Horizon Air QX   
Chautauqua Airlines Inc. RP   
Sunworld International Airlines SM   
Sun Country Airlines SY   
ATA Airlines TZ   
United Air Lines Inc. UA   
US Airways Inc. US   
Southwest Airlines Co. WN   
Midwest Airlines YX   
  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.5 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in estimation.  We use the 
consumer price index to deflate the price variable.  Thus, it is measured in constant year 1999 
dollars.  The mean fare and number of passengers are approximately $164 and 144, respectively.  
The Opres_demand variable indicates that, on average, airlines offer nonstop service to 
approximately 28 distinct cities out of the market origin city. 
Similar to Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012), to facilitate estimation of the dynamic entry/exit 
part of the model, we use a number of passenger threshold to determine whether or not an airline 
is actively servicing an origin-destination market.  Specifically, we define an airline to be active 
in an origin-destination market during a quarter if at least 130 passengers travel on products 
offered for sale by the airline in this market during the quarter.
24
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 The 130 passenger threshold we use for a directional market is equivalent to the 260 for non-directional market 
used by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012). 
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Table 2.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Time period span of data: 2002-Q3-Q4 and 2004-Q3-Q4 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price
a
 163.920 59.653 51.15 1,588 
Quantity 143.627 457.616 9 10,758 
Itinerary Distance Flown (miles)
b
 1,547 701.914 67 3,962 
Nonstop Flight Distance (miles) 1,368 652.518 67 2,724 
Opres_demand 28.104 27.015 0 145 
Opres_cost 27.964 26.861 0 146 
Dpres_cost 28.168 27.071 0 145 
Inconvenience
c
 1.161 0.221 1 3 
Interstop 0.886 0.416 0 2 
Pure Online 0.961 0.195 0 1 
Traditional Codeshare 0.012 0.107 0 1 
Virtual Codeshare 0.028 0.164 0 1 
Observed Product Share 0.007   0.023 6.27E-05 0.8764 





 Measured in constant year 1999 dollars. 
b
 This variables is reported as “market miles flown” in DB1B database. 
c
 Defined as the ratio of itinerary distance to nonstop distance. 
d
 Recall that a market is defined as a origin-destination-time period combination. 
 
Table 2.6 shows the number of entry and exit events for each airline.  These entries and 
exits are critical for estimating the fixed and entry cost functions in the dynamic part of the 
model.  The model assumes that airlines will optimally choose which markets to enter and exit in 
order to maximize their expected discount streams of future profit.  Consequently, they will only 
enter a particular market if the one-time market entry cost does not exceed their expected 
discounted future profit of entering.  Moreover, they will exit a market if the per-period fixed 
cost exceeds the per-period variable profit of operating in that market.  The large number of 
entry and exit events shows that the airline industry is quite dynamic. 
Table 2.6 Number of market entries and exits by airlines 
Airlines Number of markets entered Number of markets exited 
Delta Air Lines Inc. 457 545 
Northwest Airlines Inc. 317 375 
Continental Air Lines Inc. 214 227 
United Air Lines Inc. 413 311 
American Airlines Inc. 346 489 
Alaska Airlines Inc. 18 6 
US Airways Inc. 165 282 
Southwest Airlines Co. 193 152 
Other Airlines 361 334 




2.4 Model  
 Demand  
Travel demand is modeled using a nested-logit model.  Potential passenger   chooses 
among a set of       alternatives in market   during period  , that is, the potential passenger 
either chooses one of the     differentiated air travel products in the market or the outside 
option/good      .  The outside option includes other modes of transportation besides air 
travel.  Products are organized into     mutually exclusive groups,           where the 
outside good is the only member of group .  A group is a set of products offered by an airline 
within a market.   
Potential passenger   solves the following utility maximization problem: 
    
           
                              
  ,     (1) 
where       is passenger  ’s indirect utility from choosing product  ;       is the mean level of 
utility across passengers that choose product  ;        is a random component of utility common 
across all products within the same group;  and      
  is an independently and identically 
distributed (across products, consumers, markets and time) random error term assumed to have 
type 1 extreme value distribution.  The parameter   lies between 0 and 1 and measures the 
correlation of consumer utility across products belonging to the same group/airline.  The 
correlation of preferences across products within a group increases as   approaches 1.  In the 
case where   is 0, the model collapses to the standard logit model where products compete 
symmetrically. 
 The mean utility,     , is specified as: 
           
                                  ,  (2)  
where      is a vector of observed non-price product characteristics.  The variables in      were 
briefly defined in the previous section, they include: (1) the number of intermediate stops in a 
product (Interstop);  (2) an alternate measure of itinerary convenience (Inconvenience); (3) a 
measure of the size of an airline’s presence at the origin city (Opres_demand);  (4) product-level 
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zero-one codeshare dummy variables (Traditional and Virtual codeshare);  (5) a zero-one time-
period dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the post-alliance period (Post-Alliance);  and (6) 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for products offered for sale by either Delta, Northwest, 
or Continental (DNC_demand).  The vector of parameters,  , measures passengers’ marginal 
utilities associated with the measured non-price product characteristics.  The price passengers 
pay for the product is represented by     , and associated parameter,  
 , captures their marginal 
utility of price.  Ticketing carrier fixed effects,   , are captured by airline dummy variables.  
Time period effects,   , are captured by quarter and year dummy variables.          and       
are origin and destination city fixed effects.       is the unobserved (by researchers) component 
of product characteristics that affect consumer utility.  For notational convenience, we drop the 
market and time subscripts in some subsequent equations.  
The demand for product   is given by: 
                 
       ,       (3) 
where     is the geometric mean between the origin city population and destination city 
population, which is our measure of market size.            
        is the predicted product 
share function that has functional form based on the nested logit model. 
25
   ,  , and   are vectors 
of observed non-price product characteristics, price, and unobserved product characteristics 
respectively.    ,  , and   are demand parameters to be estimated. 
 Variable Profit, Product Markups and Product Marginal Costs  
The way in which a codeshare agreement commonly works is that the ticketing carrier 
markets and sets the final price for the round-trip ticket and compensates the operating carrier for 
operating services provided.  However, partner airlines do not publicize details on their 
compensation mechanisms actually used, which may even differ across partnerships.  Our 
challenge as researchers is to specify a modeling approach that captures our basic understanding 
of what is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works without imposing too 
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The nested logit model has the following well-known predicted product share function:     
    
  





   
      
    
    
, where         
  
   




much structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts.  To achieve this balance 
we adopt the modeling approach outlined in Chen and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013). 
As suggested in Chen and Gayle (2007) and Gayle (2013), it is useful to think of a 
codeshare agreement as a privately negotiated pricing contract between partners      , where   
is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier for transporting the 
passenger, while  represents a potential lump-sum transfer between partners that determines 
how the joint surplus is distributed.  We do not attempt to econometrically identify an 
equilibrium value of  since its value is not essential for the purposes of this paper.  However, in 
laying out the dynamic part of the model, we do show where  enters the model. 
Assume that the final price of a codeshare product is determined within a sequential 
price-setting game.  In the first stage of the sequential process, the operating carrier sets the price 
for transporting a passenger using its own plane(s),  , and privately makes this price known to 
its partner ticketing carrier.  In the second stage, conditional on the agreed upon price   for 
services supplied by the operating carrier, the ticketing carrier sets the final round-trip price    
for the codeshare product.  The final subgame in this sequential price-setting game is played 
between ticketing carriers, and produces the final ticket prices observed by consumers. 
Each ticketing carrier   offers a set of    products for sale.  Thus, ticketing carrier   solves 
the following profit maximization problem: 
                               ,       (4) 
where     is variable profit of ticketing carrier  ;    and    are the respective price and quantity 
sold of product  ; while     is the effective marginal cost ticketing carrier   incurs by offering 
product   for sale.   
Let         index the corresponding operating carriers.  In the event that product   is 
a traditional codeshare product, then       
    
 
, where   
  is the marginal cost that ticketing 
carrier   incurs by using its own plane to provide transportation services on some segment(s) of 
the trip needed for product  , while   
 
 is the price ticketing carrier   pays to operating carrier   
for its transportation services on the remaining trip segment(s).  If instead product   is a virtual 
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codeshare product, then       
 
, where   
 
is the price the ticketing carrier pays to operating 
carrier   for its exclusive transportation services in the provision of product  .26    Last, if product 
  is a pure online product, then       
 .  Note that in the pure online product case the ticketing 
carrier is also the sole operating carrier of product  , i.e.,    .   
In summary, the effective marginal cost that ticketing carrier   incurs by providing 
product   to consumers is given by: 
 
    
 
 
   
    
 
                                      
  
 
                                  
  
                             
     (5) 
 
Note that   
  directly constitutes per-passenger expenses incurred by ticketing carrier   when it 
contributes operating services with its own plane to product  , while   
 
 is correlated with per-
passenger expenses incurred by operating carrier   when it contributes operating services to 
product  .  But why is the price,   
 
, that operating carrier   charges ticketing carrier   for carrier 
    operating services correlated with marginal cost incurred by carrier  ?  This is an implication 
of the assumed sequential price-setting game that determines equilibrium prices of codeshare 
products.  The reason is as follows.  In the first stage of the sequential price-setting game, 
operating carriers each optimally choose   
 
, i.e., each operating carrier   solves the following 
profit maximization problem:    
  
      
 
   
 
        , where    is the set of products in the 
market to which carrier   contributes its transportation services, while   
 
 is the marginal cost 
that carrier   incurs by using its own plane to provide transportation services to product  .  In 
equilibrium,   
 
 is positively correlated with   
 
.  So both   
  and   
 
 in equation (5) are a 
function of factors that influence the marginal cost of operating carriers.  Therefore, when we 
subsequently specify a parametric marginal cost function for econometric estimation,    will be 
a function of factors that influence the marginal cost of operating carriers. 
                                                 
26
 The implicit assumption here is that the ticketing carrier of a virtual codeshare product only incurs fixed expenses 
in marketing the product to potential passengers. 
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 In equilibrium, the amount of product   an airline sells equals to the quantity demand, 
that is,                     
       , which implies that the optimization problem in 
(4) for each airline can be re-written as:  
                               
               (6) 
Such optimizing behavior yields the following system of   first-order equations:  
         
   
   
          for all        .          (7) 
The system of first-order equations in (7) can be represented compactly in matrix notation: 
                 ,         (8)  
where  ,   , and   are     vectors of product price, marginal costs, and predicted product 
shares, respectively;   is a     matrix of appropriately positioned zeros and ones to reflect 
ticketing carriers’ “ownership” structure of the J products in a market;  is a     matrix of first-
order derivatives of product market shares with respect to prices, where element     
   
   
; and .* 
is the operator for element-by-element matrix multiplication.  Since for purposes of the model 
the ticketing carrier is considered the “owner” of a product, in the discussion that follows, 
“airline” is synonymous with ticketing carrier.    
 Equation (8) can be rearranged to compute product markups:  
                               ,     (9) 
where                is the vector of demand parameter estimates.  Let                 
be an element in            .  Note that                is the product markup function 
which depends exclusively on demand-side variables and parameter estimates. 
With computed product markups in hand, product marginal costs can be recovered by: 
                            .      (10) 
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In addition, an airlines’ variable profit in a market can be computed by:  
                                 .      (11) 
2.5 Dynamic Entry/Exit Game 
In every period (quarter), each airline decides which market(s) to be active in to 
maximize its expected inter-temporal profits.  An airline being active in a market means that the 
airline actually sells products to consumers in the market even though a subset of those products 
may use the operating services of the airline’s codeshare partner carriers.   
Let airlines be indexed by  , markets by  , and period by  .  An airline’s expected 
discounted stream of profit in market m is given by:  
 
         
        
 
    ,      (12) 
 
where         is the per-period profit of the airline in market  and         is the time 
discount factor.  Each airline’s per-period profit is specified as the difference between variable 
profit and the sum of recurrent fixed and one-time market entry costs: 
 
         
                 
                      
    ,   (13) 
 
where     
            is the variable profit of airline   in market   during period  .  The 
value       is computed from the short-run price-setting game described previously.        is a 
zero-one indicator variable that equals to 1 if airline   had decided in period     to be active in 
market   during period  .       is also a zero-one indicator variable, but unlike     ,       
equals 1 if airline   decides in period   to be active in    .  Therefore, by definition      
       .  
After deciding to be active in a market, we assume that it takes time (one period) for 
airline   to actually begin offering products to consumers in market   - time-to-build 
assumption.   This time-to-build assumption implies that if        and       , then airline   
pays fixed and entry costs in period   even though it does not actually begin offering products to 
consumers until       Note that in period t,      is a decision variable, while      is a state 
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variable.  So we use different letters (     versus     ) to make the distinction between an 
airline’s decision versus a state variable.   
       and       are the deterministic portions of fixed and entry costs functions 
respectively and are common knowledge for all airlines.      
   and     
   represent private 
information shocks to fixed and entry costs respectively.  The composite shock          
   
            
   is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) over airlines, 
markets, and time period based on a specific probability distribution function, which we assume 
is the type 1 extreme value distribution. 
We specify the deterministic portions of fixed and entry costs functions as follows: 
 
           
     
                 
                         
                                 
                   
                                 
                                         ,  (14) 
 
           
     
                
                         
                                  
                   
                                 
                                        ,  (15) 
 
where             is a measure of the size of an airline’s presence at the endpoint airports of 
origin-destination market m, which we define as the mean across Opres_cost and Dpres_cost 
variables.                        is a zero-one time-period dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 only during the post-alliance period.                   is a zero-one airline dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the airline is one of the airlines that is a part of the alliance, i.e., 
Delta, Northwest or Continental.  The structural parameters to be estimated are: 
 
   
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
       
  
  and   
  measure the mean fixed and entry costs across airlines, markets and time, 
respectively.    
  and   
  capture the effects of the size of an airlines' airport presence on its 
market-level fixed and entry costs.    
  and   
  capture how fixed and entry costs change for all 
other airlines except the alliance partners across the pre- and post-alliance periods.    
  and   
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measure any persistent systematic difference in mean fixed and entry costs of the alliance 
partners relative to other airlines.  The coefficients of key interest are   
  and   
  , which 
identify changes in fixed and entry costs resulting from the implementation of the DNC alliance, 
that is, these parameters capture the possible fixed and entry cost efficiency gains associated with 
the alliance. 
 The mean recurrent fixed cost parameter   
   may comprise fixed expenses incurred by a 
ticketing carrier when the carrier markets a codeshare product to potential consumers.  In 
addition, recall that       represents a privately negotiated codeshare contract between partner 
carriers, where   is a per-passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier 
for transporting the passenger, while  represents a potential lump-sum transfer between partners 
that determines how the joint surplus is distributed.  We have already shown that   enters the 
effective marginal cost of the ticketing carrier.  However, the lump-sum transfer between 
partners, , is nested in   
  , but we do not attempt to separately identify  since knowing its 
value is not essential for the purposes of our paper. 
 Reducing the Dimensionality of the State Space 
Recall that the variable profit function is defined as: 
      
              ,        (16) 
where               is computed based on equation (11).  Note that variable profits are 
functions of state variables      .  Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) suggest that these state 
variables can be aggregated into a single state variable,     
 , rather than treating       as 
separate state variables, which serves to significantly reduce the dimensionality of the state 
space.  The vector of payoff-relevant state variables is the following: 
 
               
                                    .  (17) 
 
Each airline has the same vector of state variables, which it takes into account when 
making decisions.  Decision-making of each airline also depends on the strategies and actions of 
other airlines via     
 .  Recall that     
  depends on competition from other incumbents 
currently in the market, which implies that this state variable depends on the previous period’s 
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entry/exit decisions of other airlines.  Thus, the dynamic entry-exit game does implicitly take 
into account strategic interaction among competitors. 
 Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) 
For notational convenience, we drop the market subscript.  Let                 be the 
vector of strategies for each airline where             
                                    is 
a vector of common knowledge state variables and     is assumed to be i.i.d.  In a Markov 
Perfect Equilibrium each airline behaves according to its best response strategy, which 
maximizes its own value function given the state and strategies of other airlines.     
Let   
          be the value function for airline  .  This value function is the unique 
solution to the following Bellman equation: 
 
  
             
         
 
   
                   
     
                           
              
  ,  (18) 
 
where    
          is the expected per-period profit function and   
               is the expected 
transition of state variables.  We describe how state variables transition in Appendix C.  The 
profile of strategies in   is a MPE if, for every airline i and every state         , we have:  
 
                 
         
 
   
                   
     
                           
              
 .  (19) 
 
In Appendix B we illustrate that the MPE can also be represented as a vector of conditional 
choice probabilities (CCPs) that solves the fixed point problem         , where   
                                                  is a vector of best response probability 
mapping, where     is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution.  
2.6 Estimation of Demand and Marginal Cost Functions 
  Our strategy for estimating the demand parameters           is such that the observed 
market shares,     , are equal to the market shares predicted by the model     .  As shown in 
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Berry (1994), in the case of the nested logit model, such an estimation strategy implies the 
following linear equation: 
     
                          
                                       
                                                        ,      (20) 
 
where      is the observed share of the outside good and        is the observed within group 
share of product j.  Equation (20) can be estimated by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) given 
that the equation is linear, and      and            are endogenous.  
 We use the following linear specification for the marginal cost function: 
 
                                                   
 
                
                  
 
                                            
                                                                                
                                                             
                                                                                         
                         
                                                                        
            
where       represents product-level marginal cost estimates that were recovered using 
equation (10).       is a vector of observed marginal cost-shifting variables and    is the 
associated vector of parameters to be estimated.   
  Parameters   and    measure how marginal cost changes as an airline’s presence 
increases at the market origin city (Opres_cost).  Opres_cost counts the number of different 
cities that an airline has nonstop flights from going into the origin city of the market.  Similarly, 
  and    measure how marginal cost changes as an airline’s presence increases at the market 
destination city (Dpres_cost) measured by the number of different cities that an airline flies to 
from the destination city of the market using nonstop flight.  Parameters   ,   ,   , and    should 
indirectly capture the effects of economies of passenger-traffic densities, i.e., the existence of 
economies of passenger-traffic density implies the following sign pattern:     ,     , 
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    , and     .  This sign pattern of the parameters suggests that an airline’s marginal cost 
of transporting a passenger in a market decreases as its measure of Opres_cost and Dpres_cost 
increases beyond a certain level.  The reasonable presumption here is that, as an airline's 
measures of Opres_cost and Dpres_cost increase for a given market, the airline is likely to 
channel more passengers through this market who are on their way to various destinations.  
                is a zero-one time-period dummy variable that equals 1 during post-
alliance time periods.            is a product-dummy indicator variable that equals to 1 for all 
products where the operating carrier or the operating carrier group is a subset of the three 
carriers, Delta, Continental, or Northwest.  Given that interaction variable                
          is included in the model, parameter   , which is the coefficient on               , 
measures, on average, how marginal cost changes over the pre-post DNC alliance periods for 
products that are not associated with Delta, Northwest or Continental.  Parameter    , which is 
the coefficient on          , measures how the mean marginal cost of the alliance partners 
over the entire sample period differs from other airlines.  Parameter   , which is the coefficient 
on interaction variable                         , measures whether the three partner 
airlines’ marginal cost changed differently over the pre-post alliance periods relative to other 
airlines.  Thus    should pick up marginal cost effects of the alliance.  For example,      
suggests that the alliance reduces partner carrier’s marginal cost. 
We also include three-way interaction variables,                          
              and                                       .  These variables are used 
to capture whether marginal cost effects associated with the alliance depend on the size of the 
partner carriers’ presence at the market origin and market destination cities, respectively.  For 
example,  it is possible that the alliance may have a larger impact on marginal cost the larger the 
partner airlines’ presence at endpoint airports of the relevant market.  In the event that economies 
of passenger-traffic density is the key driving force for marginal cost effects of the alliance, we 
expect the coefficients associated with these three-way interaction variables to be negative, i.e., 
    , and      .    
    is an airline-specific component of marginal cost captured by operating 
carrier/operating carrier group dummy variables.     captures time-varying effects on marginal 
cost that are unobserved by us the researchers.  These unobserved time-varying effects are 
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measured using quarter and year dummy variables.          and       are sets of origin and 
destination city dummy variables respectively.  Finally,     
   is an unobserved random 
component of marginal cost.  The marginal cost equation (equation (21)) is estimated via 
ordinary least squares (OLS). 
 Instruments 
The product price (    ) and the within group share (      ) variables are likely to be 
correlated with unobserved product characteristics,     .  Therefore, consistent estimation of 
coefficients associated with these variables in the demand equation (equation (20)) requires a set 
of instruments that are uncorrelated with the demand residual but correlated with price and 
within group share.   
The instruments that we use are: (1) itinerary distance; (2) interaction of jet fuel price 
with itinerary distance; (3) an airline's market sum itinerary inconvenience measure; and (4) 
mean number of intermediate stops across products offered by an airline in a market.  
As discussed in Gayle (2007 and 2013), instruments (1) and (2) are motivated by the fact 
that a product's price is influenced by the marginal cost of providing the product.  The intuition 
for instrument (1) is that flying distance covered by an air travel product is likely to be correlated 
with the marginal cost of providing the product.  For instrument (2), airlines' marginal costs are 
likely to change differently when there are shocks to jet fuel price.
27
  These two instruments 
should be valid since itinerary distance and fuel price shocks are unlikely to be correlated with 
    .   
Instruments (3) and (4) are primarily used to deal with the endogeneity of within group 
product share.  Instrument (3) measures the sum of itinerary inconvenience associated with 
products offered by an airline in a market.  Itinerary inconvenience is a flight distance-based 
measure we previously define in the data section of the paper.  For the nested logit demand 
model, we group products by airline.  Since passengers may prefer the set of products offered by 
an airline in a market because these products offer relatively more convenient travel itineraries, 
then it is likely that within group share is correlated with instrument (3).  Similarly, instrument 
(4) is likely to be correlated with within group share because passengers may prefer a set of 
                                                 
27
 Jet fuel price data are drawn from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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products offered by a particular airline to other airlines’ products owing to differences in number 
of intermediate stops associated with the products.     
The instruments rely on the fact that the menu of products offered by airlines in a market 
is predetermined at the time of shocks to demand.  Furthermore, unlike price and within group 
product share, the menu of products offered and their associated non-price characteristics are not 
routinely and easily changed during a short period of time, which mitigates the influence of 
demand shocks on the menu of products offered and their non-price characteristics.    
2.7 Results from Estimation of Demand, Markup and Marginal Cost 
Functions 
 Demand Results 
Table 2.7 shows estimation results for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS).  Both regressions include sets of dummy variables for ticketing carriers, 
origin cities, destination cities and time periods, although associated coefficient estimates for the 
dummy variables are not reported in the table. 
 Focusing on the first two variables—Price and within group share,         - there are 
considerable differences in terms of the sign and magnitude of the associated coefficient 
estimates across the OLS and 2SLS results.  The coefficient on Price has the wrong sign 
(positive) in the OLS regression.  Furthermore, although the estimates on the within group share 
variable are between 0 and 1 in both regressions, the OLS estimate is more than fifteen times the 
size of the 2SLS estimate.  These differences indicate that OLS is biased and inconsistent.  The 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that Price and within group share are 
exogenous with over 99 percent confidence.  Therefore, the need to use instruments is justified.   
We regress each endogenous variable against the instruments using OLS as a check on 
how well the instruments can explain variations in the endogenous variables.  We find that the R
2
 
measures for the regressions of price against instruments and within group product share against 
instruments are 0.128 and 0.409 respectively, which suggest that the instruments do explain 
variations in the endogenous variables.  Therefore, the following discussion is based on results 
from the 2SLS regression. 
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The coefficient on the Price variable now has the expected negative sign.  Although the 
coefficient on          is statistically greater than zero, the magnitude is closer to 0 than 1.  This 
suggests that even though products offered by the same airline are closer substitutes relative to 
the cross substitutability of products offered by different airlines, the degree of brand-loyalty to a 
given airline’s products is weak. 
Table 2.7 Demand Estimation 
152,983 observations.  2002-Q3-Q4 and 2004-Q3-Q4 
 2SLS OLS 
Variable Estimates Std. Error Estimates Std. Error 
Price -0.0078*** 0.0002 0.0004*** 0.00004 
         0.0334*** 0.0052 0.5103*** 0.0019 
Opres_demand 0.0083*** 0.0002 0.0136*** 0.0001 
Interstop -1.185*** 0.0096 -0.6797*** 0.0062 
Inconvenience -0.9983*** 0.0141 -1.0421*** 0.0110 
Traditional Codeshare -0.7435*** 0.0275 -0.3871*** 0.0213 
Virtual Codeshare -0.9560*** 0.0181 -0.7084*** 0.0139 
              -0.2007*** 0.0078 -0.0417*** 0.0058 
           -0.3660*** 0.0134 -0.4639*** 0.0103 
                         0.0143 0.0118 -0.0708*** 0.0092 
Constant -1.7697*** 0.0478 -3.2277*** 0.0312 
Ticketing carrier effects YES YES 
Market Origin effects YES YES 
Market Destination effects YES YES 
Quarter effects YES YES 
R-squared 0.3746 0.6188 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman: 18274***                        Prob_Value = 0.0000 
***indicates statistical significance at 1%. 
The coefficient on Opres_demand is positive as expected.  Passengers prefer to fly with 
an airline that offers nonstop service to more destinations out of their origin city.  Frequent-
travelers might benefit the most since they are more likely to join a frequent-flyer program 
offered by an airline that flies to many nonstop destinations out of their origin city.  Participation 
in such programs allows these passengers to accumulate miles and therefore renders them less 
likely to use other airlines for future travel from their home airport. 
The negative coefficients on the variables Interstop and Inconvience are also expected.  
Passengers prefer traveling to their destinations using nonstop flights compare to flights that 
have intermediate stops.  Inconvenience is the ratio of the itinerary distance to nonstop distance 
between the origin and destination cities.  It measures the relative itinerary convenience that the 
variable Interstop does not capture.  The level of convenience flying from Atlanta to New York 
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with one stop in Washington DC is likely to be very different than flying from Atlanta to New 
York with one stop in Denver.  Although both itineraries have a single intermediate stop, 
depending on where that intermediate stop is relative to the origin and destination city, the two 
itineraries may yield different levels of convenience for the passenger [Gayle (2007)].    
The coefficients on the Traditional and Virtual Codeshare variables are negative.  The 
product type dummy variable excluded from the regression is Pure Online.  The negative 
coefficient estimate on the Traditional Codeshare variable suggests that traditional codeshare 
products are less preferred compare to pure online products.  Traditional codeshare products 
have more than one operating carriers, whereas pure online products are ticketed and operated by 
the same carrier.  It may be easier for the same airline to organize and streamline its products 
more efficiently than multiple airlines can.  This organization and streamlining may take the 
form of the airline’s ability to position its gates at more convenient locations and reducing the 
layover time for passengers.  Despite efforts of partner carriers, the negative coefficient estimate 
on the Traditional Codeshare variable suggests that these conveniences are difficult to achieve in 
a traditional codeshare product [Gayle (2013)].  Similarly, the negative coefficient estimate on 
the Virtual Codeshare variable suggests that these codeshare products are associated with lower 
utilities relative to pure online products.  Ito and Lee (2007) argue that because the ticket was 
purchased from a partner carrier, passengers using virtual codeshare products typically cannot 
get first-class upgrades using their frequent-flyer miles.  This makes virtual codeshare products 
less attractive compare to pure online products. 
Post Alliance is a time period dummy variable that equals to one for the post-alliance 
period.  This variable captures the mean change in consumers’ utilities associated with non-DNC 
products over the pre-post alliance periods.  The negative coefficient estimate suggests that over 
the pre and post-alliance periods, the mean level of utility decreases for non-DNC products.  The 
variable DNC_demand is a dummy variable that equals to one for all products where the 
ticketing carrier is either Delta, Northwest or Continental.  The negative coefficient estimate 
suggests that, throughout the entire sample period, DNC products are associated with a lower 
mean utility level relative to non-DNC products.   
The coefficient of the interaction variable,                         , captures 
how consumers’ utility change differently for DNC products relative to non-DNC products over 
the pre and post-alliance periods.  While the coefficient estimate is positive, it is not statistically 
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significant, suggesting that, on average, mean utility obtained from DNC products did not change 
differently relative to change in mean utility of non-DNC products over the pre-post alliance 
period. 
Our demand model yields a mean own-price elasticity estimate of -1.3.  A reasonable 
range for own-price elasticity in the airline industry is from -1.2 to -2.0 as pointed out by Oum, 
Gillen and Noble (1986), and Brander and Zhang (1990).  Berry and Jia (2010) in their 2006 
sample find own-price elasticity estimates ranging from -1.89 to -2.10, while Gayle and Wu 
(2012) estimates range from -1.65 to -2.39.   Even though our demand model seems to produce a 
relatively low mean own-price elasticity, we believe that it is reasonable and consistent with the 
existing literature. 
 Computed Product Markups, Marginal Costs, and Variable Profits 
Summary statistics on price, markup, marginal cost, and the number of passengers per 
product are computed for each airline.  The overall mean product price and markup are $163.92 
and $132.83, respectively.  The Lerner index— a measure of the product markup as a percentage 
of price—indicates that overall, airlines are able to raise their price above marginal costs by a 
mean of 89.85%.  Mean marginal cost is $31.09.  Even though this level of markup over 
marginal cost seems high, it is necessary for their overall profitability because the airline 
industry has relatively high fixed costs. 
Quarterly market-level variable profits for each airline are computed using equations (9) 
and (11) along with the demand estimates.  Recall that the original database, before any cleaning, 
is only a 10% sample of air travel tickets sold. This implies that the magnitudes of variable profit 
estimates are at most roughly 10% of actual variable profits.  Overall median quarterly market-
level variable profit for an airline is approximately $43,810.  The quarterly median market-level 
variable profit for Delta and Northwest is approximately $37,000, while Continental is a little 
higher, almost $45,000. 
 Results from Estimation of Product Markup Function 
 Table 2.8 shows estimation results for a reduced-form product markup equation.  Here, 
we examine whether the markup for DNC products changes differently compare to markup for 
non-DNC products due to formation of the DNC alliance.  The sign and magnitude of the 
coefficient on                          suggests that even though the formation of the 
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DNC alliance has a negative effect on the three partner carriers product markup compare to their 
competitors, the reduction in markup is quite small, only about 38 cents reduction.  So there is no 
evidence that implementation of the DNC alliance increased market power of the three alliance 
partners [Gayle and Brown (2013)]. 
Table 2.8 Estimation Results for Product Markup Regressed on  
Several of its Determinants 
152,983 observations.  2002-Q3-Q4 and 2004-Q3-Q4 
Variable Estimate Std. Error 
Post Alliance 0.1242* 0.0647 
DNC_demand -1.1932*** 0.1145 
                         -0.3808*** 0.1020 
Opres_demand 0.1174*** 0.0012 
Interstop -0.4976*** 0.0617 
Traditional Codeshare -0.8920*** 0.2369 
Virtual Codeshare -1.800*** 0.1550 
Constant 128.6452*** 0.3098 
Ticketing carrier effects YES 
Market Origin effects YES 
Market Destination effects YES 
Quarter effects YES 
  *, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels respectively.  Equation is  
estimated using ordinary least squares. 
 
 All other control variables in Table 2.8 have the expected sign.  First, the positive 
coefficient estimate on the Opres_demand variable suggests that the size of an airlines’ presence 
at the origin airport of a market is positively related to markup.  This evidence is suggestive of 
the existence of a hub premium, i.e., airlines have higher market power at their hub airports and 
thus are able to charge higher markups on flights out of their hub airports [Borenstein (1989)].  
Second, we know from our demand results that passengers prefer nonstop flights to their 
destinations.  Therefore, we expect products with intermediate stops have lower markup, as 
indicated by the negative coefficient estimate on the Interstop variable in Table 2.8.  Finally, our 
demand results suggest that traditional and virtual codeshare products are less preferred to pure 
online products.  Therefore, it is not surprising that codeshare products have lower markup 
compare to pure online products, as indicated by the negative coefficient estimates on 
Traditional Codeshare and Virtual Codeshare variables in Table 2.8. 
74 
 
 Results from Estimation of Marginal Cost Function  
Table 2.9 presents estimation results for two marginal cost specifications, labeled in 
columns of the table as Specification 1 and Specification 2, respectively.  The two specifications 
help us better assess how the size of market endpoint presence of the alliance partners might 
affect marginal cost effects of the alliance.  By using variables Opres_cost and Dpres_cost, we 
are able to capture the marginal cost effects of an airline’s scale of operation or “hub-size” at the 
respective origin and destination airports of the market.  We anticipate that these variables will 
reveal the forces of economies of passenger-traffic density that an airline can enjoy as the airline 
is likely to channel higher volumes of passengers through the market due to its large presence at 
the market’s endpoints.  As expected, the sign pattern of these variables and their squares suggest 
that a carrier's marginal cost initially increases with the size of its presence at the market 
endpoints, but once its presence increases beyond a certain threshold, the carrier's marginal cost 
declines with further increases in its presence at the market endpoints.  This result suggests that 
economies of passenger-traffic density can be achieved by an airline.   
How “big” should the hub-size be before an airline is able to enjoy economies of 
passenger-traffic density?  The magnitude of the coefficient estimates on Opres_cost and 
(Opres_cost)
2
 suggest that an airline can enjoy economies of passenger-traffic density within the 
market if the number of different cities that an airline has nonstop flights from going into the 
origin city of the market exceeds 453.  Similarly, the coefficient estimates on Dpres_cost and 
(Dpres_cost)
2
 suggest that an airline has to provide nonstop service to more than 301 different 
cities from the destination city of the market before it can enjoy economies of passenger-traffic 
density within the market.  The “slight” problem is that a single airline typically does not connect 
that many different cities to the market endpoints via nonstop flights.  In our sample, the mean 
number of different cities an airline connects to a given market endpoint using nonstop flights is 
28 and a maximum of 145. 
Still focusing on the estimates in Specification 1, the negative coefficient estimate on 
               suggests that the marginal cost of products that are not associated with Delta, 
Northwest or Continental declined (by $11.34) over the pre-post DNC alliance periods.  
However, the negative coefficient estimate on           suggests that, over the entire sample 
period, the marginal cost of products offered by Delta, Northwest or Continental is on average 
lower ($13.64 lower) than that of products offered by other airlines.  An unexpected result is that 
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the coefficient estimate on the interaction variable                          is positive.  
The fact that the positive coefficient estimate on                          (2.66) is not 
large enough to outweigh the negative coefficient estimate on                (-11.34), this 
suggests that over the pre-post alliance periods the marginal cost of products offered by Delta, 
Northwest or Continental declined, but did not decline as much as the decline in marginal cost of 
products offered by other airlines.
28
  This result surprisingly suggests that the alliance attenuated 
an apparent industry-wide decline in marginal cost for the partner carriers’ rather than 
precipitated the decline.   
In Specification 2 of the marginal cost function we added three-way interaction variables, 
                                           and                            
             .  The coefficient estimates on these variables are negative, suggesting that 
implementation of the alliance may have precipitated a decline in marginal cost for the partner 
carriers in some markets.  In particular, the alliance seems to precipitate a decline in the partner 
carriers’ marginal cost in markets where they have sufficiently large hub-size presence at the 
origin or destination airports of the relevant market.  The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates 
on three-way interaction variables relative to the coefficient estimate on                
         , suggest that the alliance will precipitate the decline in the partners’ marginal cost 
in markets where the partners provide nonstop service from more than 75 (= 14.38/0.19) 
different cities going into the market origin airport, or more than 68 (= 14.38/0.21) different 
cities via nonstop flights from the destination airport. 
The endpoint airport hub-size thresholds are satisfied by each of the three partner carriers 
at several airports during the post-alliance period.  For Delta, Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson (ATL) 
and Cincinnati (CVG) satisfy both market origin and destination thresholds, while Dallas/Fort-
Worth (DFW) International Airport satisfies the market destination threshold.   For Northwest, 
Detroit Metropolitan (DTW), Memphis (MEM), and Minneapolis–Saint Paul International 
(MSP) satisfy both thresholds, while the destination threshold is satisfied at George Bush 
Intercontinental (IAH).  Finally, for Continental, Cleveland Hopkins (CLE), Ellington 
International (EFD), Newark Liberty (EWR), George Bush Intercontinental (IAH), LaGuardia 
(LGA), William Hobby Airport (HOU), and John F. Kennedy (JFK) satisfy both thresholds.  
                                                 
28
 Marginal cost of Delta, Northwest and Continental products declined by $8.68 (= $11.34 - $2.66), while the 
marginal cost of products offered by other airlines declined by $11.34. 
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Table 2.9 Marginal Cost Function Estimation 
152,983 observations.   
Pre-alliance period: 2002:Q3 2002:Q4. Post-alliance period 2004:Q3 and 2004:Q4 
 Coefficient Estimates 
(Std. Error) 

































                                --- -0.1907*** 
(0.0164) 
                                --- -0.2077*** 
(0.0003) 












Operating carrier/group effects YES 
Market Origin effects YES 
Market Destination effects YES 
Quarter effects YES 
R-squared 0.2860 0.2886 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.  Equations are estimated using ordinary least squares. 
 
The crucial “take-away” result to note here is that the alliance enables the partner carriers 
to achieve economies of passenger-traffic density that might not be otherwise achievable.  Recall 
that Specification 1 of the marginal cost function suggests that the hub-size threshold required 
for a single carrier to achieve economies of passenger-traffic density was well beyond the hub-
size of a typical carrier.  However, the results in Specification 2 suggest that once the carrier 
belongs to an alliance, then the hub-size threshold needed to exploit economies of passenger-
traffic density is significantly less, and achievable.  These findings fit squarely with our 
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expectation of how an alliance may influence marginal cost via economies of passenger-traffic 
density.        
 In terms of the remaining regressors, Itinerary Distance Flown measures the number of 
miles flown from the origin to destination city.  The coefficient is positive as expected, 
suggesting that itinerary distance positively impact marginal cost.  The variable Codeshare 
Product is a dummy variable that equals to one if the product is either traditional or virtual 
codeshare.  The coefficient estimate suggests that the marginal cost of offering a codeshare 
product is on average $12.35 less than offering a pure online product.   
 Results from Estimation of Reduced-form Price Regression 
Since standard oligopoly theory predicts that equilibrium price is equal to marginal cost 
plus markup, this implies that changes in markup and marginal cost should be reflected in price.  
An advantage of directly using a reduced-form price regression is that it does not embed the 
strong assumptions required for a structural model.  Of course, the strong assumptions of the 
structural model buy us the advantage of being able to separately analyze markup and marginal 
cost.  So both approaches, reduced-form versus structural, have advantages and disadvantages.  
In an attempt to exploit the advantages of both approaches, we now estimate a simple reduced-
form price regression to achieve two objectives: (i) provide a useful rough “reality check” on 
inferences already drawn from the structural model; and (ii) provide additional economic insights 
on the relative magnitudes of markup versus marginal cost effects.   
Table 2.10 shows the estimation results for a reduced-form price regression.  The 
negative coefficient estimate on                suggests that prices of non-DNC products 
decrease over the pre-post alliance periods.  Results from our structural analysis suggest that, 
over the pre-post alliance periods, the markup of non-DNC products increase, but their marginal 
cost decrease.  The fact that the reduced-form price regression reveals that price of non-DNC 
products decrease over the pre-post alliance periods, we can infer that the decrease in marginal 




Table 2.10 Estimation Results for Reduced-form Price Regression 






Opres_cost 0.5202*** 0.0231 
(Opres_cost)
2 0.0011*** 0.0002 
Dpres_cost 0.5638***   0.0002 
(Dpres_cost)
2 0.0008*** 0.0002 
              -11.38*** 0.3252 
       -15.25*** 0.5024 
                     14.50*** 0.7325 
                                -0.2018*** 0.0152 
                                -0.2188*** 0.0152 
Itinerary distance flown (miles) 0.0354*** 0.0003 
Interstop -1.85*** 0.4064 
Traditional Codeshare -6.19* 3.618 
Virtual Codeshare -15.41*** 0.8113 
Constant 104.36*** 1.418 
Operating carrier/group effects YES 
Market Origin effects YES 
Market Destination effects YES 
Quarter effects YES 
R-squared 0.3090 
***, * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 10% levels respectively.  Equation is estimated  
using ordinary least squares. 
 
The negative coefficient estimate on the variable DNC_mc in the reduced-form price 
regression suggests that, on average, DNC products have lower prices relative to non-DNC 
prices.  The joint results from the reduced-form price regression and the structural analysis 
therefore imply that DNC products have a lower price than non-DNC products due to DNC 
products having both lower markup and lower marginal cost.  
The sign pattern of coefficient estimates on interaction variables,                
         ,                                  , and                          
         in the reduced-form price regression suggest that implementation of the alliance 
precipitated a decline in the partner carriers’ price only in markets where they have sufficiently 
large hub-size presence at the origin or destination airports of the relevant market.  We now see 
that such price changes reflect changes in the partner carriers’ marginal cost, and therefore likely 
driven by alliance partners being better able to exploit economies of passenger-traffic density.  
As expected, distance has a positive effect on price.  For every 100 miles increase in 
itinerary distance the price increases by $3.54.  Since passengers prefer nonstop products, prices 
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are lower for products with more intermediate stops.  Codeshare products (traditional and virtual) 
are also priced lower because these products are seen as inferior compare to pure online 
products.  
2.8 Estimation of Dynamic Entry/Exit Game 
Consider the following pseudo log likelihood function:  
  
              
             
        
  
                       
        
  
       
 
   
 
   ,  (22) 
where       is called the “pseudo” log likelihood function because players’ conditional choice 
probabilities (CCPs) in vector   are arbitrary and do not represent the equilibrium probabilities 
associated with parameter vector   implied by the model.  Recall that   represents the vector of 
parameters in the fixed and entry cost functions.   
 We begin by implementing a two-step pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PML).  
The first step involves estimating the relevant state transition equations and obtaining 
nonparametric estimates of the choice probabilities,    .  Nonparametric estimates of choice 
probabilities allow us to construct consistent estimates of       
   and      
   .  Appendix E describes 
construction of       
   and      
   .  With      
   and      
    in hand, we can construct the pseudo log 
likelihood function,         .   
 In the second step, we estimate the vector of parameters by solving the following 
problem:  
             
 
        ,       (23) 
where       is the two-step pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PML).  The computation in 
the second step is simple as it only involves estimation of a standard discrete choice model.  The 
main advantage of the two-step estimator is its computational simplicity because it does not 
require solving for an equilibrium in the dynamic game, which greatly reduces the computational 
burden.  However, as discussed in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), the two-step PML estimator 
may have large finite sample bias.  One reason for the bias is that the nonparametric 
probabilities,    , enter nonlinearly in the sample objective function that defines the estimator, 
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and the expected value of a nonlinear function of     is not equal to that function evaluated at the 
expected value of    .  Second, the nonparametric probability estimates themselves can have 
large finite sample bias, which in turn causes bias in the PML estimator.  These potential 
problems with the PML estimator lead us to implement the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) 
estimator proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007).  In Appendix F we provide more 
discussion on implementing the NPL estimator.  
2.9 Results from Estimation of Fixed and Entry Cost Functions 
Table 2.11 presents estimation results for the recurrent fixed and sunk market entry cost 
functions.  We are better able to identify the coefficients in the entry cost function than the 
coefficients in the fixed cost function.  In the fixed cost function, the parameters that measure 
mean fixed cost and the coefficient on the size of an airline’s airport presence are unreasonably 
small and not precisely estimated.  We expected the coefficient estimate associated with airport 
presence to be positive, suggesting that fixed cost increases with the size of an airline’s operation 
at an airport.  As the scale of operation increases, fixed expenses such as the addition of gates 
and facilities should be higher. 
The negative fixed cost coefficient on the dummy variable                  suggests 
that the alliance partner carriers have a lower mean fixed cost relative to the mean fixed cost of 
other airlines over the pre and post-alliance periods.  For a typical origin-destination market, the 
mean quarterly fixed cost of Delta, Northwest and Continental is approximately $15,400 lower 
than the mean quarterly fixed cost across other airlines.    
The coefficient on the variable                       in the fixed cost function 
measures how the fixed cost of airlines that are not Delta, Northwest or Continental changes over 
the pre and post-alliance periods.  Since this coefficient estimate is not statistically different from 







Table 2.11 Parameter Estimates for Recurrent Fixed and  
Sunk Market Entry Cost Functions 
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.  The alliance firms are Delta, Northwest, and Continental 
airlines. 
The coefficient of primary interest is on the interaction variable 
                                       because it measures how the fixed cost of partner 
carriers in the DNC alliance changes relative to other airlines between the pre and post-alliance 
periods.  Therefore, it captures fixed cost effects associated with formation of the alliance.  
Interestingly, the coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the 
formation of the DNC alliance has resulted in higher recurrent fixed costs for the alliance 
partners.  In a typical origin-destination market, the DNC alliance is associated with an increase 
in partner carriers’ quarterly fixed cost by an average of $9,907.  As we previously suggested, 
the alliance is likely to increase the volume of passengers that travel on each partner carriers’ 
network.  Accommodating a higher volume of passengers may require partner carriers to acquire 
more airport gates and a larger airport staff to handle more intensive airport operations.  This is a 
plausible explanation for the increase in partners’ recurrent fixed cost. 
We now turn to discussing results for the entry cost function.  Recall that entry cost is the 
one-time sunk cost that an airline incurs if it wants to begin offering service in a market.  The 
mean one-time market entry cost is estimated to be $33,318.  As previously computed from the 
Nash price-setting equilibrium part of the model, overall median quarterly market-level variable 
Pre-alliance period - 2002:Q3-Q4 







Fixed Cost Function    
     Mean Fixed Cost 4.40e-10 0.00574 7.68e-08 
                 -2.10e-12 0.00016 -1.32e-08 
                      -1.54*** 0.04281 -36.08 
                           1.81e-09 0.00711 2.54e-07 
                                           0.9907*** 0.05350 18.52 
Entry Cost Function    
     Mean Entry Cost 3.3318*** 0.04027 82.74 
                 -0.0082*** 0.00034 -24.52 
                      1.30*** 0.07029 18.53 
                           -0.9634*** 0.04486 -21.48 
                                            -0.7494*** 0.08703 -8.61 
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profit of an airline is $43,810.  Therefore, the one-time mean entry cost is more than 75 percent 
of median quarterly variable profit.  
The coefficient estimate on the size of market endpoint airport presence is negative as 
expected, suggesting that an airline’s market entry cost decreases as size of the airline’s presence 
at the endpoint airports increases.  This result is consistent with much of the airline literature that 
discusses the determinants of market entry [for example see Berry (1992) and Goolsbee and 
Syverson (2008)].   
The positive coefficient estimate on the dummy variable                  suggests that 
for a typical origin-destination market, the mean entry cost for Delta, Northwest, and Continental 
is higher than the mean entry cost of other airlines by $13,000.  The coefficient on 
                      dummy variable in the entry cost function measures how the market 
entry cost of other airlines—airlines that are not Delta, Northwest or Continental—change 
between the pre-and post-alliance periods.  The coefficient estimate on this variable suggests that 
their market entry costs decreased about $9,634 between the pre and post-alliance periods.   
The variable of primary interest in the entry cost function is                       
                , as the coefficient on this interaction variable measures if entry cost changes 
differently for the alliance partners relative to other carriers over the pre and post-alliance 
periods.  Essentially, this interaction variable allows us to measure whether entry cost savings are 
associated with the alliance.  The negative coefficient estimate on this variable suggests that the 
DNC alliance has resulted in a decrease of the market entry costs for the alliance partners relative 
to other airlines.  The partner carriers’ market entry cost decrease, on average, by an additional 
$7,494 due to the alliance.  As we previously discussed in the introduction of the paper, an 
alliance effectively allows an airline to enter several new origin-destination markets more 
cheaply by leveraging its partners’ network rather than having to exclusively use its own planes 
to enter these markets.  So our empirical finding of market entry cost savings for partner carriers 
is consistent with our expectation.  We are unaware of any other paper in the literature that has 
shown evidence of entry cost savings associated with an alliance.  
In sum, we find that although the formation of the DNC codeshare alliance has decreased 




2.10 Concluding Remarks 
 The literature on codeshare alliances is extensive.  But an important aspect of codeshare 
alliances that has received little empirical analysis is their effect on partner airlines’ cost, perhaps 
due to the difficulty of obtaining cost data at the route-level.  The studies that have examined 
cost effects use aggregate measures of cost that do not distinguish between marginal, recurrent 
fixed, and sunk market entry costs, which makes it difficult to draw inferences for short-run price 
changes versus medium to long-run market structure changes.  For example, while changes in 
marginal cost more quickly influence short-run equilibrium pricing, changes in recurrent fixed 
cost and sunk market entry cost will influence the ease with which alliance partners can enter 
new markets in the medium to long-run.  Furthermore, since an alliance may differentially affect 
different components of cost, the use of aggregated cost data can cause researchers to mistakenly 
find that alliances have very little impact on airlines' costs. 
Our study sets out to address the above-mentioned shortcomings in the existing literature 
by empirically estimating marginal, recurrent fixed, and sunk market entry costs effects 
associated with an airline alliance using a structural econometric model that does not require the 
researcher to have cost data.  Therefore, our study offers two crucial distinguishing features from 
others in the literature.  First, our methodology does not require having actual cost data to draw 
inference on changes in cost associated with an alliance.  Second, our methodology separately 
identifies changes in economically relevant components of cost associated with an alliance. 
Our empirical results suggest that implementation of the Delta-Northwest-Continental 
alliance resulted in:  (1) a decrease in marginal costs for the alliance partners in markets where 
the airlines have a large presence at their market endpoints; (2) reduced sunk market entry costs 
for the alliance partners; and (3) the alliance however is associated with higher recurrent fixed 
costs for the partners.  It is interesting that we find that the partners’ recurrent fixed costs are 
higher following implementation of the DNC alliance.  Perhaps it is the case that the overall 
effect on cost is small since higher recurrent fixed costs may negate some of the savings from 
reductions in marginal and sunk market entry costs.  But the broader, and conceivably more 
important, point is that an alliance does influence partner airlines’ cost components differentially, 
and each of these cost components may have different implications for short-run versus medium 
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Appendix A - Transition Rules for State Variables 
 The vector of state variables:             
                             .  The 
following are the state transition equations:   
          ,         (A1) 
 
      
        
    
    
     
  ,      (A2) 
 
            
       
              
    .     (A3) 
Variable profit and airline presence follow an exogenous Markov process with probability 
distribution     
  and     
     , respectively, that we assume to be normally distributed. 
 We assume that the probability that next period (t+1) is a post-merger period for the 
relevant merger being studied is exogenously determined by information firms have about the 
current state.  Furthermore, we assume that the parametric probability distribution governing this 
process is normal, which implies the following probit model: 
 
                                    
    
       
    
    
        . (A4) 
Appendix B - Representation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) 
using Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs) 
 Recall that the per-period profit function is given as: 
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which implies that, 
 
               
 ,         (B1) 
 
               




                 




             
     
                                                       
                                                                  
                                                               
                                                
           (B4) 
and 
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Therefore, we can rewrite the per-period profit function as: 
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 An MPE can also be represented as a vector of conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) 
that solves the fixed point problem         , where 
                                        .           is a vector of best response 
probability mapping: 
 
      
    
 
  
    
                                         (B8) 
 
where     is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution, and 
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  and    
  are vectors of valuations that depend on CCPs and transition probabilities, but not 
on the dynamic parameters being estimated.  Since     is assumed to be distributed extreme value 
type 1,   




Appendix C - Implementing the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) 
Estimator  
 As discussed in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), the two-step PML estimator may be 
subjected to finite sample bias.  One reason for the bias is that the nonparametric probabilities, 
   , enter nonlinearly in the sample objective function that define the estimator, and the expected 
value of a nonlinear function of     is not equal to that function evaluated at the expected value of 
   .  Second, the nonparametric probability estimates themselves can have finite sample bias, 
which in turn causes bias in the PML estimator.  These potential problems with the PML 
estimator lead us to implement the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) estimator proposed by 
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007).  
 Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) consider a recursive K-step extension of the two-
step PML estimator, which they refer to as the NPL estimator.  Since we have the two-step 
estimator       and the initial nonparametric estimates of CCPs,    , we can construct new CCP 
estimates,    , using the best response CCPs equation: 
 
                .       (C1)   
 
We then solve the pseudo log likelihood function again using    instead of     to obtain new 
estimates for , that is, we solve:            
 
        .  We again construct new CCP 
estimates,    , using:               .  This process is repeated K times: 
 
           
 
                 (C2) 
and  
                ,       (C3) 
 
where on the K
th
 iteration the choice probability vector     is sufficiently close to       based on 
a tolerance level that we chose.  The result is an NPL fixed point, which can be define as a pair 
      where   maximizes the pseudo likelihood function, and    is an equilibrium probability 
vector associated with  .  Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) argue that the NPL algorithm 




Appendix D - Transition Rules for State Variables 
 The vector of state variables:             
                                    .  The 
following are the state transition equations:   
 
          ,         (D1) 
 
      
        
    
    
     
  ,      (D2) 
 
                
       
                  
    .   (D3) 
Variable profit and airline presence follow an exogenous Markov process with probability 
distribution     
  and     
     , respectively, that we assume to be normally distributed. 
 We assume that the probability that next period (t+1) is a post-alliance period for the 
relevant alliance being studied is exogenously determined by information firms have about the 
current state.  Furthermore, we assume that the parametric probability distribution governing this 
process is normal, which implies the following probit model: 
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Appendix E - Representation of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) 
using Conditional Choice Probabilities (CCPs) 
 Recall that the per-period profit function is given as: 
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which implies that, 
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Let 
                 




             
     
                                                            
                                                  
                     
                                                                
                                                 
            (E4) 
and 
       
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
    .   (E5) 
Therefore, we can rewrite the per-period profit function as: 
                       ,      (E6) 
                       .      (E7) 
A MPE can also be represented as a vector of conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) that 
solves the fixed point problem         , where                                         .  
         is a vector of best response probability mapping: 
      
    
 
  
    
                                      ,   (E8) 
where     is the CDF of the type 1 extreme value distribution, and 
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     ,  (E13) 
where    
     and    
     are state transition probability matrices for       and       
respectively; while     
  and     
  are vectors of valuations that depend on CCPs and transition 
probabilities, but not on the dynamic parameters being estimated.  Since     is assumed to be 
distributed extreme value type 1,   





Appendix F - Implementing the Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) 
Estimator  
 Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) consider a recursive K-step extension of the two-
step PML estimator, which they refer to as the NPL estimator.  Since we have the two-step 
estimator       and the initial nonparametric estimates of CCPs,    , we can construct new CCP 
estimates,    , using the best response CCPs equation: 
 
                .       (F1)   
We then solve the pseudo log likelihood function again using    instead of     to obtain new 
estimates for , that is, we solve:            
 
        .  We again construct new CCP 
estimates,    , using:               .  This process is repeated K times: 
 
           
 
                 (F2) 
and  
                ,       (F3) 
where on the K
th
 iteration the choice probability vector     is sufficiently close to       based on 
a tolerance level that we chose.  The result is an NPL fixed point, which can be defined as a pair 
      where   maximizes the pseudo likelihood function, and   is an equilibrium probability 
vector associated with  .  Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) argue that the NPL algorithm 
significantly reduces the bias of the two-step PML estimator. 
